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I. INTRODUCTION
The American legal system has not always responded well in times
of deep intellectual, social, and political unrest. From Debs,1 to the
Japanese Relocation Cases,2 to Dennis,3 the courts have often leaned
with, rather than against, the winds of orthodoxy and popular preju-
dice; they have tended to vindicate officialdom, particularly at the
federal level, in its response to dissent or potential disloyalty. There
have been exceptions, to be sure, but renunciation of abuse has often
come only belatedly.
One of the legal weapons used in the traditionally unequal contest
between government and dissent has been the doctrine of criminal con-
spiracy. While there has been much critical comment concerning the
nature and uses of this historic crime, and while the literature sur-
rounding the first amendment rights of free speech and association is
certainly voluminous, relatively little careful study has been directed
to the ways in which the two concepts converge and conflict when the
government institutes prosecutions for conspiracy to commit speech or
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas, S.B. 1953, University of Wiscon-
sin; LL.B. 1958, Harvard University. Member, Ohio Bar.
I There were two Debs cases in the Supreme Court. The first, growing out of a
Pullman strike is In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); the second, Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919), involves a conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40
Stat. 217. Both are appropriate references here. As to the latter, see notes 52, 54 infra
& accompanying text.
2 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See generally Rostow, The
Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
3 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See text accompanying notes 75-107
infra.
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speech-related offenses, an American variant of the "political crime."
Indeed it is only fairly recently that commentators have begun to
focus on the analytical questions involved in the use, in first amend-
ment areas, of conspiracy doctrine developed in other, non-speech
contexts. Perhaps the lag should not be too surprising. The law of free
speech itself is a comparatively recent development in our constitu-
tional history, by and large evolving only within the past half-century;
and, notwithstanding criticism of conspiracy doctrine and its use, the
crime is supported by a long tradition which seems to have muted con-
stitutional challenge. The recent commentary particularly directed to
the conspiracy-speech combination has been provoked by the trial of
Dr. Spock and his alleged co-conspirators.4 United States v. Spock5
is only an example, however, and the issues there raised have pervasive
implications in other related situations.'
Typically, when government acts against dissenters or the un-
orthodox, the rhetorical claims, if not the legal issues, are framed in
terms of suppression of freedoms, particularly first amendment free-
doms. By virtue of the very fact that the underlying issues are usually
public, political, and controversial, they tend to generate responses
founded on ideological, racial, or humanitarian grounds, and lead to
attempts at association designed to strengthen the sources of resistance.
The very effectiveness of almost any social or political effort in our
highly organized and complex society-particularly when it challenges
government policy or power-may well depend on its success in enlist-
ing the aid of others of like mind. Thus, the allegedly offending action
is often of a collective nature, involving a group which finds its origin
in a shared opposition to official action or inaction.
Predictably, then, a charge of conspiracy comes to the prosecu-
torial mind as a base for the institution of criminal proceedings. The
crime is obviously well adapted to the political and ideological uses to
which it has been put History has produced an offense which is both
vague in its substance and malleable in its procedures.8 Its elements
4 See, e.g., Note, Conspiracy: Legitimate Instrument or an Unconstitutional Weapon?,
3 CoLU-E. SURVEY OF HuxAN RiaiGTs LAw 94 (1970); Note, The Logic of Conspiracy,
1970 Wis. L. REv. 191; Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872
(1970).
5 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
6 Another recent case in which a speech conspiracy indictment was used is that of
the "Chicago Seven," United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180 (N.D. III., Feb. 14-15,
1970), rev'd, No. 18,295 (7th Cir., Nov. 21, 1972), noted in 69 MicH. L. Rxv. 1549 (1971),
in which the defendants were charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to cross state lines with
intent to incite a riot. See 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
7 Even the commentators to the A.L.I. Model Penal Code, which defends and carries
forward much of traditional conspiracy doctrine, feel it necessary to pay verbal deference
to such special grievances as those based on the early condemnation of the labor union
as a "criminal conspiracy and the use of the charge against political offenders . . .
MODEL PENAL ConE § 5.03, Comment at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
8 Originating in the 13th century as a device to deal with what we now call malicious
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can be stated with deceptive simplicity.9 Conviction requires agreement
or combination, illegal means or illegal ends, and some sort of improper
motive or intent. No overt act in furtherance of the agreement is neces-
sary except as required by the particular statute under which the charge
is laid, and even then there is confusion about its significance: whether
as an essential element of the crime or as merely part of the evidence
of conspiracy.' It is the agreement itself which is the touchstone of
illegality, irrespective of whether or not efforts have actually been made
to implement prohibited objectives, and apparently without regard even
to whether the combination is capable of achieving them. The very
existence of group purpose is enough, without more, to support the
presumption of societal danger warranting criminal punishment.
Reliance on conspiracy holds a number of familiar attractions for
the prosecutor. The application of the conspiracy label serves to brand
the opposing group with an image of secrecy and evil plotting that
tends to exaggerate the threat of the challenged conduct and heightens
apprehensions latent in the community." More directly, the charge of
prosecution, the crime of conspiracy, within a few hundred years, came to include
combinations whose objectives were not limited to misuse of the courts or the litigative
process. Once freed of its narrower beginnings, conspiracy was quickly associated with
control and punishment of economic and political activities. See generally Sayre, Criminal
Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393 (1922).
!DAttempts to describe the crime in specific terms have proven extremely difficult,
if not completely frustrating. justice Jackson concluded that the "modem crime of
conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition. Despite certain elementary and
essential elements, it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the
many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid. It is always 'predominately
mental in composition' because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an in-
tent." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446-48 (1949) (concurring opinion)
(citations omitted). One commentator has declared: "In the long category of crimes there
is none, not excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries
of definitive statement than conspiracy." Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U.
PA. L. R!v. 624, 624 (1941). An earlier writer was led to assert that "no intelligible
definition of 'conspiracy' has yet been established." R.S. WpIGHET, Tuz LAW o CR=AL
CoNsPmAcmms AND AGREEMETS 11 (1887).
A facile-and non-helpful-try at description was made by justice Holmes in United
States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910), where he labeled conspiracy "a partnership
in criminal purposes."
10 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957) ; Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347 (1912) (majority and dissenting opinions); Developments in the Law:
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 945-48 (1959) (hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments].
11 An interesting article discussing conspiracy in psychiatric terms suggests that in-
vocation of the concept plays on the inherent fears, suspicions, and insecurities of both
individuals and groups. Katz, A Psycho-Analytic Peek at Conspiracy, 20 BUFFALo L.
Rav. 239 (1970). Not only is the "notion of conspiracy . ..useful in 'explaining' the
anxiety one feels toward otherwise ambiguous events (e.g., the Kennedy assassination
and campus disruptions)," id. 249, but, one might add, also in accounting for the exis-
tence of dissent and opposition to government policy. As the author notes:
The instinctual appeal of conspiracy means that if people are given any sugges-
tion that a conspiracy exists their psychological matrix of expectations shifts the
burden of proof to the extent of creating in their own minds a presumption
in favor of the reality of such a conspiracy. In other words, people seem more
ready to believe an allegation of conspiracy ("there is more to this than meets
the eye") than they are to accept apparent explanations.
Id. 345-46. The result suggests why conspiracy is so useful in the political case:
Quite apart from the effect of this presumption on the outcome of actual
1972]
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conspiracy gives the government substantive flexibility and ease of
proof as well as specific procedural advantages which can operate to
the substantial prejudice of the defendants. The rule against admission
of hearsay evidence, for example, is relaxed to allow the acts and alleged
words of co-conspirators (whether or not co-defendants) to be used
against each other, even when cross-examination of the declarant is
possible. 2 The regular order of proof is eased and the prosecution
afforded great freedom in making its case.' 3 "As a practical matter, the
accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts and statements
by others which he may never have authorized or intended or even
known about, but which help to persuade the jury of existence of the
conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evi-
dence that is admissible only upon the assumption that conspiracy ex-
isted. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instruction to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be un-
mitigated fiction."' 4
There is substantial danger that any given defendant will become
the victim of guilt by association. Not only does the very presence of
all the defendants together in the courtroom itself suggest their combi-
nation and complicity, but there usually will be some evidence of
illegality by someone and, given the lengthy trial and voluminous rec-
ord typical of conspiracy proceedings,' 5 the jury will find it hard to
sort out the individual merits of the case against each accused."6 The
litigation, it has significant political and social consequences. By employing the
rhetoric of plot or conspiracy, any group ... can generate substantial apprehen-
sion, and use the anxiety thus generated to support policy decisions which might
otherwise not stand up against rational argument.
Id. 246. In Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (concurring opin-
ion), Justice Jackson stated:
The crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant connota-
tions. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret plotting and violence
on a scale that menaces social stability and the security of the state itself. "Privy
conspiracy" ranks with sedition and rebellion in the Litany's prayer for deliver-
ance.
12 For a discussion of the conspiracy exception to the general rule regarding the
admission of hearsay evidence, see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949);
Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. Rav. 1159 (1954).
15 Developments, supra note 10, at 984. See also Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud
the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 412 (1959).
14 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion) (cita-
tions omitted).
15 Conspiracy cases-especially political ones-seem to have a way of producing
unusually lengthy trials and trial records. This can hardly make the jury's task easier
or more likely to produce a fair verdict. For example, the case of the "Chicago 7," supra
note 6, took over four months to present; more than 200 witnesses were called and the
transcript ran in excess of 22,000 pages.
16 An additional advantage to the government in a conspiracy prosecution is the wide
latitude in choosing the court in which the case will be tried. Venue in a conspiracy trial
will lie in the district where the agreement was formed, or where any of the overt acts
of any of the co-conspirators occurred. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 356-67
(1912). Thus, for example, the government could choose to try the Berrigan conspiracy in
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use of the conspiracy indictment in order to obtain prosecutorial ad-
vantage, even as applied to non-political cases, has met serious criti-
cism from legal scholars: "[T]he general critique has pointed to the
danger of a dragnet in the broad, uncertain ground of liability, the
wholesale joinder of defendants, the imposition of vicarious responsi-
bility, the relaxation of the rules of evidence, or some or all com-
bined.' 7 Misuse of the conspiracy charge and the panoply of govern-
mental advantages in conspiracy trials led Mr. Justice Jackson in his
noted concurrence in Krulewitch v. United States,8 to conclude that
the "loose practice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to
fairness in our administration of justice."
The risk of prejudice at the trial is accentuated when the case
involves dissenters whose views are in themselves likely to be dis-
tasteful to both judge and jury. The threat of conspiracy indictments
in such cases also has an important effect which works outside the
courtroom. While the danger of an indictment for conspiracy, as an
alternative or addition to an indictment for a substantive speech crime,
may have little or no "chilling effect" on the first amendment rights of
those who are determined to speak, it is a significant deterrent to the
less hardy-those who would assist or aid others to speak. By virtue of
an alleged "agreement" that a speech should be made, they may become
indictable as co-conspirators with the speaker. Even if such 'third par-
ties escape indictment, they run the risk that their words and actions
will be used in the government's case against those who are defendants.
In such a setting-where the dragnet charge is so useful a tool
to punish those who express critical, unorthodox, or unpolular views-
it is crucial that the propriety of reliance on the charge of conspiracy
to commit a speech crime be given the closest scrutiny. Peculiarly sub-
ject to abuse in even the run-of-the-mine criminal case, the conspiracy
device-the "darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery"' 9-demands
heightened critical analysis when basic political rights may be at stake.
II. CONSPIRACY: THE GENERAL JUSTIFICATION
Criminal conspiracy is usually categorized and treated as an in-
choate offense-as a device designed and used to thwart incipient sub-
stantive evil. But this single conception does not comport with its
Harrisburg, Pa., and thereby avoid other more accessible Eastern cities with a climate
potentially more hospitable to the anti-war movement and with facilities better adapted
to serving the press and television corps.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
IS 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949). Jackson's opinion was joined by Justices Frankfurter
and Murphy.
19 Judge Learned Hand in Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
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practical use." The conspiracy charge is perhaps pressed even more
often after completion of a substantive offense than before. The ra-
tionale of each aspect of the offense-conspiracy as the punishable
precursor of substantive criminal conduct and as an additional part of
the indictment even after achievement or attempted achievement of
its criminal objectives-is relevant to understanding its application to
speech.
A. The Inchoate Crime
Normally, the criminal law is concerned only with punishment of
actions which have produced harmful consequences to an individual
or to society. The law, by and large, has focused on conduct which
constitutes a completed offense and has not sought to punish planning
or preparation, much less intent standing alone. The interests involved
in such a resolution are fairly clear-cut and seemingly well-settled.
Although one might argue that prevention of crime could be better
accomplished by punishing still nascent offenses, if not intent itself,
there are strong countervailing considerations. The possible gains are
generally thought to be outweighed by the likelihood of restricting
otherwise innocent activities and inhibiting the exercise of personal
freedoms, and by the serious risk of error in making the necessarily
subtle and difficult factual determinations that would be required. Even
so, in a few instances, the law has allowed prosecution for conduct
occurring earlier in the causal chain. Thus we have the so-called in-
choate crimes: attempt, incitement (or solicitation), and conspiracy
are the classic examples. Each reaches back in time, prior to the com-
pletion of the substantive offense, and seeks to punish for something
less than effectuation of the ultimate harm.
Attempt is closest in both temporal and physical proximity to the
final offense and indeed may be separated from it only by the actor's
own ineptitude or some fortuitous intervention that precludes success.
But, still, attempt does require more than mere preparation; there must
be an effort to perpetrate the substantive crime. 1
Incitement calls for no more than the effort to induce another to
2 OThus the A.L.I. Model Penal Code groups conspiracy in article 5, entitled
"Inchoate Crimes," but declares:
It is worthwhile to note preliminarily that conspiracy as an offense has two
different aspects, reflecting different functions it serves in the legal system. In
the first place, it is an inchoate crime, complementing the provisions dealing with
attempt and solicitation in reaching preparatory conduct before it has matured
into commission of a substantive offense. Secondly, it is a means of striking
against the special danger incident to a group activity, facilitating prosecution
of the group and yielding a basis for imposing added penalties when combination
is involved.
MoDa-. PEA- CODE § 5.03, Comment at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
21 See R. PERM NS, ClMmNAL LAW 552, 557, 561 (2d ed. 1969).
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commit the criminal act and it matters not whether the other actually
agrees to do so or even makes an attempt; purposeful communication
designed to procure commission of the substantive offense is the essen-
tial ingredient.
2
Among the trio, conspiracy is most distant from the completed
harm. In practice, the dimensions of the conspiracy concept have be-
come quite flexible and even the requirement that there be an overt act
has lost substantive significance.tm As a result, conspiracy prescribes
punishment for little more than state of mind. Though the liturgy of
courts and commentators recites the proposition that the agreement
represents conduct, not merely state of mind, agreement in reality is
no more than shared state of mind;2 4 and when one accepts the prin-
ciple, as the courts have done, that the agreement can be implicit as
well as explicit, and that the trier of fact can infer its existence from
still other facts,"5 the element of conduct shrinks to still smaller dimen-
sions.
The rationale of making conspiracy a crime, it is said, is the in-
creased danger to society from the existence of a group bent on criminal
activity. The incremental threat posed by the combination is asserted
to support the proscription even though the same threatened conduct
and state of mind in a single individual would not be punishable. The
justification seems based on a set of factually unproven and perhaps
undemonstrable assumptions: that the combination increases the like-
lihood that the contemplated criminal activity will actually occur and
that the venture will be successful; that the conspirators will reinforce
each other in strength of purpose and intent; that they will work to dis-
pel each other's doubts; that they will find added strength and effec-
tiveness in numbers and in the division and specialization of labor they
22 Id. 582, 584.
23At common law, no overt act was even required. See Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211, 216 n.4 (1946); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912). The
rule has been carried forward so that the government need not prove an overt act unless
compelled by the statute under which the charge is laid. No overt act was required for
conviction in Spock.
Even when proof of an overt act is necessary, it "has seldom materially increased
the difficulty of securing convictions for conspiracy." Developments, supra note 10, at 946.
As the Supreme Court said in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957):
It is not necessary that an overt act be the substantive crime charged in the
indictment as the object of the conspiracy. Nor, indeed, need such an act,
taken by itself, even be criminal in character.
The act can thus be "relatively minor," even a telephone call, and may consist of a
failure to do something, so long as it is in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Develop-
ments, supra, at 946. "The courts somehow discover an overt act in the slightest action
on the part of the conspirators." Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEo. L.J. 328,
338 (1947).
24 See Developments, supra note 10, at 925-27; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 409-10.
25 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946);
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 3,19 U.S. 703, 714 (1943).
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allow; that the dimension and complexity of the harm will be multiplied
by the increase in participants; and that they will be better able to
utilize, dispose of, or benefit from the fruits of their crime, thereby
adding to the difficulty of discovery and ultimate punishment 6
Some or all of this may be true in given cases; but as one critic
of the doctrine has written:
Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a ro-
mantically individualistic ring, they have never been verified
empirically. It is hardly likely that a search for such verifica-
tion would end in support of Holdsworth's suggestion that
combination alone is inherently dangerous. This view is im-
mediately refuted by reference to our own society, which is
grounded in organization and agreement. More likely, empiri-
cal investigation would disclose that there is as much reason
to believe that a large number of participants will increase
the prospect that the plan will be leaked as that it will be kept
secret; or that the persons involved will share their uncertain-
ties and dissuade each other as that each will stiffen the oth-
ers' determination. Most probably, however, the factors ordi-
narily mentioned as warranting the crime of conspiracy would
be found to add to the danger to be expected from a group in
certain situations and not in others; the goals of the group
and the personalities of its members would make any general-
ization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for
treating conspiracy as a separate crime in all cases.27
If there is reason to question the unrefined generalization that
group planning is inherently more dangerous than the planning of a
crime by an individual, there is also reason to question the assumption
that the mere possibility of prosecution for conspiracy works any effec-
tive deterrent, in and of itself, beyond that achieved by the existence of
the penalties for actual commission of the substantive crime which is
the objective of the combination. It is unlikely that one who is willing
to risk the punishment established for success in achieving the criminal
purpose of the conspiracy will be additionally deterred by the threat
26See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Note, The
Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defen-
dants, 62 HARv. L. R V. 276, 283-84 (1948). The rationale is not of recent origin, though
it has rarely been questioned. For an example of an early American case explicating some
of the asserted distinctions between group and individual action, see Commonwealth v.
Carlisle, 36 Bright 38, 41 (1821):
The effort of an individual to disturb the equilibrium can never be perceptible,
nor carry the operation of his interest, or that of another individual, beyond the
limit of fair competition; but the increase of power by combination of means,
being in geometrical proportion to the number concerned, an association may be
able to give an impulse, not only oppressive to individuals, but mischievous to
the public at large; and it is the employment of an engine so powerful and
dangerous, that gives criminality to an act that would be perfectly innocent,
at least in a legal view, when done by an individual.
27 Goldstein, supra note 13, at 414.
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of punishment merely for agreeing in advance to so act. Even the pro-
posed Model Penal Code, which would preserve most of extant con-
spiracy law, concedes as much. 8 Still the extension of the criminal law
to the inchoate offense of conspiracy does permit the authorities to
intervene, if they discover the offending plan, without awaiting the
ultimate event. Obviously, the greater the reality and dimensions of
the anticipated evil, the more plausible is the effort to forestall it. By
the same token, if the danger is of a lesser order, the countervailing
factors noted earlier assume greater weight in the balance.
These considerations have particular pertinence in the context of
speech crimes, not only because the need for early restraint may be far
from compelling, but because of the involvement of the first amend-
ment. Continued reliance on conspiracy as an inchoate offense in speech
cases should take account of the extent to which it is actually effective
or necessary to prevent the evil which the conspirators would seek to
achieve. And, beyond the question of pragmatic need, there are serious
conceptual and constitutional problems presented when conspiracy is
treated as an inchoate offense in application to speech. 9
B. The Crime of Complicity
Theoretically, at least, the main use of conspiracy doctrine should
be against combinations which have not yet moved to achieve their
criminal purposes-against conspiracies which are still executory in
whole or substantial part. Certainly the rationale that conspiracy is
necessary to allow the government to abort intended criminal conduct
before it matures into a committed substantive offense fails to justify
resort to conspiracy once the illegal plans have been realized and prose-
cution for the substantive offense is possible. Nonetheless, parallel sub-
stantive and conspiracy counts are common prosecutorial practice and
it may be as likely that the former will be omitted as the latter when
either or both are legally possible in any given case °
In those instances in which the substantive crime has already oc-
curred, reliance on conspiracy works a change in both the nature and
purpose of the prosecution. Conspiracy ceases to be used as a device to
punish or thwart inchoate offenses and takes on a different coloration.
For principals in the completed offense, it does the work (in alternative
28 MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5, Comment at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
29 See text accompanying notes 161-94 infra.
30 Thus, Justice Jackson was moved to warn in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1949), that "the unavailing protest of courts
against the growing habit to indict for conspiracy in lieu of prosecuting for the substantive
offense itself, or in addition thereto, suggests that loose practice as to this offense con-
stitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice."
1972]
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form) of the substantive charge; 31 for more peripheral figures, it oper-
ates as a charge of complicity in the completed crime.
It is asserted that in some instances the charge of conspiracy is
essential in order to reach those who bear a significant responsibility
for criminal activity, but whose tangible contribution is difficult to
prove by usual means. The example commonly given is that of organized
crime, where the planner, the initiator, or the beneficiary of the criminal
act is a higher-up, a key figure in the organization whose power, in-
fluence, and importance relieve him of obvious participation in the ac-
tual commission, but not of culpability.32 The broad-ranging conspiracy
trial with multiple defendants, it is said, provides a unique opportunity
to probe the dimensions and workings of a complex criminal design33
On one level, the use of conspiracy to reach both principal and ac-
complice in completed criminal action is less onerous than its employ-
ment to punish the unexecuted agreement. Doubt as to whether, absent
discovery and prosecution, the alleged conspirators would in fact have
moved beyond planning or preparation is removed. Concern about
whether punishment is being imposed for mere intent alone is alleviated
because the actual effort to fulfill the conspiratorial objective serves as
guarantor of the defendants' firmness of purpose and commitment, a
function that might have been served in part by the overt act require-
ment had its content not been so significantly dilutedV4 There still re-
mains, however, the familiar danger that the very latitude and loose-
ness of the conspiracy trial may prejudice individual defendants. This
risk may be especially great in cases involving speech conspiracies and
there is grave doubt that it can be justified by society's legitimate
needs.
III. CONSPIRACY AND SPEECH CI-M s: A PRELi rNAn y ANALYsIs
Much of the difficulty in grappling with the concept of conspiracy
to commit a speech crime is a function of the almost total failure of the
31 The reasons for such use are not hard to fathom. For the prosecutor, the con-
spiracy case, with all its procedural and evidentiary freedoms, brings substantial tactical
advantages at trial. See notes 11-19 supra & accompanying text.
32 An early version of proposed revision of federal criminal law suggested, however,
that "traditional conspiracy notions" were "outdated when applied to an organized
criminal business" and recommended a specially drafted provision to deal with organized
crime. The final report of the study commission "shelved" the preliminary proposal in
favor of imposition of increased penalties for leaders of organized crime. Compare
NATIONAL CoinmsszoSN ON REFORm or FEDERAL CRnmNAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMtNAL CODE § i005, Comment at 68 (Study Draft 1970) with NATIONAL
Co ssioN ON REFORm or FEDERAL CRnmINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRnmTAL
CODE § 1004, Comment at 72 (Final Report 1971). For another example of the use
of conspiracy to reach the planners or initiators of criminal activity, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101,
2102 (1970) (punishing interstate travel with intent to incite a riot).
33 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5003, Comment at 98 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
34 See note 23 supra.
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courts to distinguish between the possible uses of the charge: between
conspiracy framed as an inchoate offense before any illegal speech has
occurred and its use as a device to prosecute for past illegal utterances.
The leading cases involve (or the courts seem to assume they involve)
illegal incitement or advocacy which has already occurred, thus sug-
gesting that the conspiracy allegation is relied upon to charge com-
plicity in another completed offense. Nonetheless, the decisions for
the most part treat and justify their reliance on conspiracy as if it
were being used as an inchoate offense.
So conceived, there is a deep-seated conflict between traditional
conspiracy doctrine and the law of free speech. As noted, conspiracy
alone requires only agreement, intent, and illegal purpose. When speech
is involved, however, the first amendment requires more. There must
be a sufficient governmental interest to warrant suppression 5 Even
then, only advocacy of action, actual incitement itself, may be barred8
Finally, some measure must be taken of the reality of the threat posed
by the challenged speech.8 7
When the two doctrines are fused in the context of speech-con-
spiracy, one would suppose that the constitutional demands would be
read to override the more elastic and far-reaching common law con-
cepts-that conspiracy doctrine would be strictly measured against
first amendment requirements and the application of traditional con-
spiracy rules either barred or neatly tailored to preclude intrusion into
prohibited areas. This has not been the case. Instead, the courts have
created a patchwork. Providing little by way of analysis, they have
treated the usual criminal conspiracy rules-developed in other con-
texts-as largely transferrable to speech cases. With the exception of
imprecations about the need to find specific intent, the decisions have
done little more than prescribe a meld of basically incompatible legal
concepts, leaving both first amendment and conspiracy rules to a dan-
gerous and inarticulate reconciliation in practice.
By definition, proof of criminal conspiracy is complete, and con-
viction warranted, without any showing of illegal action beyond the
agreement itself. Thus, in the case of an alleged conspiracy to incite,
for example, there would be no need to show that the defendants de-
livered themselves of any illegal words; the existence of the combined
intent to do so would suffice. Given the fact of agreement, there would
be no occasion to await the apprehended danger-prosecution could be
35 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See note 80 infra & accompanying
text.
8 6 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
37 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
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initiated before any inflammatory speech were made, before any "ille-
gal" tract or pamphlet were written or published, and before any threat-
ening demonstration were held. Even where the applicable criminal
conspiracy statute calls for proof of an overt act, there is no require-
ment that it be the illegal incitement itself or, indeed, that it be illegal
conduct of any kind.
Respect for first amendment standards would seem to require that
criminality turn on more than a bare prediction of both the nature and
probable consequences of words not yet uttered. Even where speech
has crystallized the difficulties of reconciling the first amendment and
statutes proscribing advocacy are inordinate. One would not expect
the courts to compound these difficulties and to undertake appraisal
of projected or future advocacy. Yet, with but slight variation, the lan-
guage of the speech-conspiracy decisions appears to assume that this
may be done.
The case to be made against the speech-conspiracy combination
is a strong one, in both constitutional and practical terms. Before sub-
jecting it to more particularistic exposition and analysis, however, it is
useful to trace the American application of conspiracy doctrine to
speech and to try to discover how and why the courts have left the law
in such an unsatisfactory state. Several reasons may be ventured. The
first Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of the combi-
nation were decided before the full body of first amendment law had
itself developed; indeed, they were handed down almost concurrently
with the beginnings of free speech doctrine. Initially, therefore, there
was simply no need to confront or rationalize two inconsistent ap-
proaches. Perhaps inhibited by the hoary tradition and rhetoric which
surrounded conspiracy, courts later built upon this narrow foundation
and did little more than condone reliance on the combination.
Another factor also may have led to faulty analysis of conspiracy
to commit a speech crime. Not surprisingly, most of the American
speech-crime conspiracy law has been developed in times of national
tension. Each of the key decisions involved dissenters whose political
deviance tended to magnify their perceived threat to national security,
thereby probably helping to propel the courts to pro-government re-
sults. The initial Supreme Court cases in the area arose during the
height of patriotic fervor in World War I and involved challenges to
the country's military involvement abroad. The anti-communist para-
noia following the Second World War produced another series of prose-
cutions which required the Court to confront the problems presented by
the concept of a conspiracy to commit a speech crime. And the Spock
case itself was an outgrowth of the passions engendered by the nation's
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commitment in Viet Nam. In none of these decisions, all of which ap-
proved the speech-conspiracy combination, did the Court deal ade-
quately with the conceptual and practical issues raised by the nature of
the prosecution. Indeed, the opinions more often added confusion by
their failure to examine the sources and nature of the conspiracy doc-
trines they imported into the speech area.
IV. THE WORLD WAR I EXPERIENCE
The modern history of speech-conspiracy law in the United States
began with a group of cases now remembered primarily for the elo-
quence of the Holmes-Brandeis dissents they engendered. It is little
noticed today that these were the decisions which first tested traditional
conspiracy law in the speech area and found the combination constitu-
tional. The union was effected easily and with little analysis. This was
perhaps expectable given the then primitive state of free speech doc-
trine.
The generating decisions in the Supreme Court are now barely
fifty years old, and they have not aged well. They are a series of nine
decisions, all but two of which were handed down in a single twelve-
month period spanning two terms of the Court. 8 All but one89 arose out
of federal prosecutions brought during the First World War charging
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.40 Several of the opinions ad-
dressed indictments joining substantive and conspiracy counts,4 1 and
all but possibly the first and last involved alleged conspiracies in which
the challenged speech, whether written or spoken, had already taken
place; that is, they involved executed, or at least partially executed,
conspiracies. In each of these, then, the conspiracy charge was not
essential to prosecution, for the "attempt" or "incitement" or "advo-
cacy" was readily available as a basis for conviction of the defendants,
typically socialists, anarchists, or other political dissenters.
The 1919-1920 cases not only established the constitutionality
38 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919); Shaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v.
United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); O'Connell v. United States, 253 U.S. 142 (1920).
39 Goldman involved a conspiracy to violate provisions of the World War I Selective
Service Act, Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76. Stilson and O'Connell both charged
a conspiracy to violate that Act as well as the Espionage Act, Act of June 15, 1917, ch.
30,40 Stat. 217.
40 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217. Title I, § 3 of the Act prohibited causing
or attempting to cause "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
military or naval forces of the United States" or obstructing "the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States." Title I, § 4 of the Act punished conspiracies to violate § 3.
4 1 In fact, Debs was the only case in the series in which a conspiracy was not
charged.
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of the concept of a conspiracy to commit a speech crime, but they
also articulated the beginnings, mainly in Holmes' dissents, of the
development of a concept of specific intent as an element of the offense
-a theme repeated later with even more emphasis in the Communist
Party cases, coming to precise application in the majority opinion in
Spock.
In Goldman v. United States,4 2 the Court unanimously affirmed
the conviction of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman upon a
single count indictment charging them with conspiracy to "induce"
others to fail to register for the draft. Though Chief Justice White's
opinion concludes that the evidence was sufficient to take the case to
the jury, the nature of the defendants' conduct was not disclosed. There
was no mention of the first amendment. Indeed, apart from declaring
that questions as to the constitutionality of the Draft Act itself had
been resolved a week earlier by the decision in Arver v. United States,
4 3
there was no suggestion that the case even raised any fundamental
issue. The opinion merely adverted to "settled doctrine" that con-
spiracy is "in and of itself inherently and substantively a crime punish-
able as such irrespective of whether the result of the conspiracy has
been to accomplish its illegal end."' ' The focus of the brief opinion was
primarily upon the evidentiary question and the rigors of criminal
conspiracy law.
The series of Espionage Act cases began a year later with Schenck
v. United States.43 Schenck and another were convicted on a three
count indictment for having printed and circulated a leaflet challenging
military conscription. The first count-which drew the primary atten-
tion of the Supreme Court--charged a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act "by causing and attempting to cause insubordination,
&c., in the military and naval forces ... and to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service... when the United States was at war with the
German Empire... 2"
Schenck and his co-defendants specifically asserted the first
amendment as a defense. In rejecting the claim and affirming the con-
victions, Holmes fashioned the "clear and present danger" test.
4 7
42 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
43 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
44 245 U.S. at 477. To support this proposition, the Court referred only to one
case, United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915) (conspiracy to violate the Bank-
ruptcy Act) "and authorities there cited." 245 U.S. at 477.
45 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46 Id. at 48-49.
47 The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Id. at 52. The test has been both praised and condemned. Compare Z. CmaF,, Flm
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Reasoning that there would be no difficulty in applying criminal
sanctions if the defendants' words had produced an "actual obstruction
of the recruiting service," he noted that section 4 of the Espionage Act
expressly proscribed conspiracies to obstruct, as well as actual obstruc-
tion, and went on to declare:
If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and
the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no
ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act
a crime.43
And so, in a few sentences, citing Goldman as authority,49 the Court
completed the meld of speech crimes and conspiracy. Holmes made no
real attempt to apply the clear and present danger test to the facts of
the case, but merely declared it to be the applicable standard, appar-
ently self-evidently met. As for the requisite intent, it was seemingly
enough to note that the leaflet "would not have been sent unless it had
been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could
be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to influ-
ence them to obstruct the carrying of it out."3 0 The theme was a
typical application of traditional common law doctrine that a man is
responsible for and deemed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts.
Schenck was followed a week later by Frokwerk v. United States,51
and Debs v. United States."' In both cases, Holmes again wrote for a
unanimous Court to affirm convictions under the Espionage Act. The
crucial charge in Frokwerk was conspiracy to violate the statute, with
the overt acts being the preparation and circulation of a dozen articles
in the Missouri Staats Zeitung, an ethnically-directed newspaper of
pro-German sympathies published by the defendant and his alleged co-
conspirator. To the contention that the first count lacked an allegation
of the means by which the conspiracy was to be carried out, Holmes
SPEECH IN TME UNITED STATES 82 (1941) With A. ME.KEyOm, FREE SPEECHa AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 29 (1948). Justice Jackson called the doctrine "the only
original judicial thought on the subject.' Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561,
567 n.9 (1951) (concurring opinion). Professor Freund has written that the clear and
present danger test calls for an "oversimplified judgment" and that the very words "tend
to convey a delusion of certitude." P. FREUiD, ON UNDERSTANDING = Sm'nREar COURT
27-28 (1949). The literature on the subject is, predictably, voluminous.
48 249 U.S. at 52.
49 Had Goldman been only slightly more expansive in its discussion, it might have
been treated as wholly controlling and the now renowned paragraph in Schenck might
never have been written. Referring to Goldman, Holmes declared, "Indeed that case
might be said to dispose of the present contention if the precedent covers all media
concludendi. But as the right to free speech was not referred to specially, we have
thought fit to add a few words." Id. at 52.
Old. at 51.
51249 U.S. 204 (1919).
52249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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simply declared that "a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be
criminal even if no means were agreed upon specifically by which to
accomplish the intent. It is enough if the parties agreed to set to work
for that common purpose."55 Again, as in Schenck, Holmes had no
difficulty whatsoever in applying traditional common law conceptions
of conspiracy to the speech case-the agreement alone was enough, he
ruled, to justify the criminal label.
Common to Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs (the only case of the
series not involving a charge of conspiracy), was their simplistic treat-
ment of intent and effect-probable consequences turn on what the
speaker is assumed to have intended, with intent to be inferred, if need
be, from his words alone; and probable effect follows on the heels of
intent without examination of the specific context in which the words
were spoken or the audience to which directed. (The only possible
exception was in Schenck's brief allusion to the fact that the leaflets
there were specifically directed to men subject to the draft or already
called.) It is surprising that Holmes, as the author of all three opinions
and of the clear and present danger test itself, paid so little attention
in these initial cases to the very factors which he and Brandeis raise
so vigorously in dissent in the immediately succeeding decisions; given
his own handbook in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, his sense of alarm
and dismay at the uses to which Schenck is put in the later cases seems
somewhat out of place.5 5
Abrams v. United States,56 decided early in the following term, was
the first Espionage Act case to split the Court. Abrams and four others
were prosecuted as a result of having published 5000 circulars, printed
in English and Yiddish, which they distributed in New York City,
"some by throwing them from a window of a building where one of the
defendants was employed and others secretly." 7 Directed to Russian
emigrees and others, the text strongly criticized Allied intervention in
Russia, encouraged support of the Soviet revolution, and called for a
general strike. Four of the defendants had taken the stand at trial and,
as Justice Clarke's opinion for the Court gratuitously pointed out, all
53 249 U.S. at 209.
154 In Debs, a non-conspiracy conviction under the Act was based on delivery of a
single speech. Debs was charged with causing, inciting and attempting to cause and incite
insubordination, etc., in the armed forces, and with obstruction and attempted obstruction
of recruitment and enlistment services.
55For the view that justice Holmes was not often particularly responsive to civil
liberties, see Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pts. 1-2), 15 STeaN. L.
REV. 3, 254 (1963).
56 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
57Id. at 618.
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had been born in Russia, none had sought American citizenship, three
"frankly avowed" that they were "rebels," "revolutionists," and
"anarchists," and the fourth that he was a socialist. 8 The first two
counts of the four count indictment, reminiscent in tone of the Alien
and Sedition Acts of a century past,"9 alleged conspiracies to utter
"disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language" concerning the form of
government of the United States and to utter language "intended to
bring the form of Government of the United States into contempt,
scorn, contumely, and disrepute."0° The last two counts were somewhat
more restrained, but still broadly drawn: again each charged a con-
spiracy, the third "to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the
United States" in the war, and the fourth to "urge, incite and advocate
curtailment of production of things and products ... essential to prose-
cution of the war."" The defendants' first amendment claims were
summarily dismissed with a reference to Schenck and Frohwerk.6 A
review of the circulars led the Court to the conclusion that the de-
fendants' intent was domestic revolution and frustration of the war
effort, enough to warrant a finding of guilt on the third and fourth
conspiracy counts; the other charges were not considered, as sentencing
had been concurrent. Following Holmes' lead in the prior cases, the
Court deduced the necessary intent from the nature of the language
used in the publications and its likely effect. This was consistent with
the common law conception that "Men must be held to have intended,
and to be accountable for, the effects their acts were likely to pro-
duce."'
Holmes, joined by Brandeis, rebelled and filed a dissent longer
than his majority opinions in Schenck, Frokwerk or Debs. Though he
stood by the propriety of the convictions in those cases,64 he made no
attempt to distinguish them on the facts or law. Instead, he now found
a need to construe intent in the strictest kind of terms. No longer suffi-
cient for him was the majority's (and seemingly his own earlier65)
broad common law conception of intent. It would not do to infer a
generalized kind of purpose from the words themselves; the substan-
Sld. at 617-18.
59 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596.
60 250 U.S. at 617.
6l Id.
62Id. at 619.
63 Id. at 621.
64 "1 never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone were
before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, were rightly decided." Id.
at 627 (citations omitted).
6 5 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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tive evil-here, interference with the war effort, etc.-must be shown
to have been the exact aim of the defendants' actions." Only when such
intent existed, perhaps either alone or with a "present danger of im-
mediate evil" was government warranted in interfering with speech.
The puny risk posed by the defendant was relevant, if not crucial:
"Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any im-
mediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so." 7 The
dissent still seemed somewhat unsure, however, about the role of intent,
for Holmes added that once given specific intent to obstruct, there
might be a greater risk and prosecution might be warranted even with-
out a clear showing of imminent danger.68 Even if incorrect with re-
spect to requisite intent and the need for imminency of harm, Holmes
thought the sentences of twenty years imposed by the trial court much
too severe and only "the most nominal punishment" appropriate,
"unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the indict-
ment alleges but for the creed they avow .... M9
In two subsequent Espionage Act cases70 the majority continued
'6There was no longer room for ambiguity as to what Holmes considered the
requirement to be under the Act:
But to make the conduct criminal that statute requires that it should be
"with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the
prosecution of the war." It seems to me that no such intent is proved.
I am aware of course that the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary
legal discussion means no more than knowledge at the time of the act that the
consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that will satisfy the
general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may have to pay
damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be hanged, if at the time
of his act he knew facts from which common experience showed that the
consequences would follow, whether he individually could foresee them or not.
But, when words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a
consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious,
and obvious to the actor, that the consequence will follow and he may be
liable for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to produce
it unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although
there may be some deeper motive behind.
It seems to me that this statute must be taken to use its words in a strict and
accurate sense. They would be absurd in any other.
250 U.S. at 626-27.
67Id. at 628.
68 Id.
691d. at 629. Decided the same day as Abrams, Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583 (1919), affirmed another conspiracy conviction under the Espionage Act, this time
involving publication of a Lithuanian language newspaper. Following the earlier pattern,
the danger created by the publication was read solely from its text, with no reference to
any of the surrounding circumstances, the breadth or nature of the circulation, or the
intended or actual audience, much less the actual or probable reaction evoked in the
readers.
70Scaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (conviction based on publication
of articles); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (conviction based on house-
to-house distribution of pamphlets).
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to find little need to go beyond an examination of the text of the chal-
lenged speech or pamphlet, while dissenters Holmes and Brandeis 71
insisted that the Court must examine the surrounding circumstances
to find evil intent and the requisite danger that harm will occur. In
Pierce v. United States,2 where Brandeis had tried to join issue on the
question of danger and made reference to the actual circumstances of
distribution, the majority refused to respond in terms, resting on its
general declaration that the matter was for the jury to determine.
Except for its somewhat vague reference to the relevance of the time,
place and manner of distribution, the majority seemed still to suggest
it sufficient for conviction to show concerted action by the defendants,
the nature of the document, and defendants' knowledge of its contents.
The final chapter of the World War I Espionage Act conspiracy
cases in the Supreme Court was written with the brief opinion in
O'Connell v. United States,73 which affirmed convictions for conspiracy
to violate the 1917 Act and to violate- the Selective Service Law. No
details of the defendants' action were given, the opinion was directed
mainly to procedural issues, and affirmance rested on citations of
Goldman, Schenck and Frokwerk.74
71 justice Clarke joined the dissenters in Schaefer. He asserted various errors in
the lower court proceedings which he attributed to the "stress and strain of feeling
prevailing in the early months of the late deplorable war." 251 U.S. at 501.
72252 U.S. 239 (1920).
73 253 U.S. 142 (1920).
74 A concluding footnote to the series of 1918-1920 cases was written a quarter of a
century later in Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944), a World War II case in
which the Court reviewed a conviction under the speech-restricting provisions of § 3
of the Espionage Act of 1917. The judgment was reversed, 5-4, but there was no opinion
of the Court. The defendant Hartzel had been found guilty on all counts of a seven
count indictment alleging publication and circulation of three anti-semitic pamphlets
depicting the war as a betrayal of America and urging its conversion into a racial
conflict, all with intent to cause insubordination and disloyalty in the armed forces and
to obstruct recruiting and enlistment services. The documents had been mailed anon-
ymously to various public figures, including some military officials. Reversal of a finding
of guilt on a conspiracy count was required, according to the plurality opinion, because
the convictions of the only two co-conspirators named in the indictment had already
been set aside by the courts below. justice Murphy, writing for only four members of
the Court, including himself, then went on to declare that the government must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, both an "objective" and a "subjective" element of the
crime: the first, that defendant's conduct created a "clear and present danger" and the
second, that he specifically intended interference with the armed forces or with recruit-
ment. 322 U.S. at 686-87. The requisite specific intent, which Murphy found not in
constitutional imperatives, but in the statute's use of the word "willfully," could be
"proved not only by the language actually used in the statements or writings themselves
but also by the circumstances surrounding their preparation and dissemination." Id.
at 687. Upon a review of the evidence, Murphy concluded that the government had
failed to carry its burden on intent and thus the convictions on the remaining six
substantive counts must also be reversed. justice Roberts concurred separately in a two-
sentence note which did no more than mark his agreement that the evidence was
insufficient to take the case to the jury, thus creating a majority for the result. justices
Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas (Douglas!), and Jackson dissented.
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V. TEE COMMUNIST PARTY CASES
The 1950's and early 1960's witnessed another round of con-
spiracy cases in the political arena. Played against the background of
the Cold War to a public moved by anti-communist fear and suspicion,
these later decisions have much in common with the World War I
cases. The tone of the post-World War II opinions was different-they
were more sophisticated and, as compelled by the intervening develop-
ment of first amendment doctrine, they asserted a serious concern for
speech rights. Although evolution of the free speech law had laid the
foundation for an emerging, if inadequate, recognition of the doctrinal
and policy conflict engendered by utilization of conspiracy in the
speech area, the period saw a nonetheless renewed pattern of largely
uncritical judicial affirmances of convictions for conspiracy to advo-
cate, and, finally, even for membership in the Communist Party.
A. Dennis
Dennis v. United States,7 5 the landmark case sustaining the con-
stitutionality of the Smith Act,76 both on its face and as applied to a
group of Communist Party leaders, displayed a variety of approaches
to the speech-conspiracy problem; little of it, however, was authorita-
tive. A divided Court affirmed convictions for conspiracy to teach and
advocate violent overthrow of the government and to organize the
Communist Party for teaching and advocacy to the same purpose. Thd
five opinions in the case ran nearly one hundred pages, but there was
none on which a majority of the eight-man Court could agree. Chief
Justice Vinson, writing for himself and three other Justices, 7 viewed
the major issues in the case as, first, whether the clear and present
danger test developed in the World War I decisions applied in the case
of a statute like the Smith Act which expressly proscribed certain kinds
75341 U.S 494 (1951).
76 Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp.
1972). Title I, §§ 2, 3 provide:
Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person-() to knowingly or willfully
advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety
of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government....
(3) to organize or help any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate
with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes
thereof.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire
to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title.
77 Chief Justice Vinson announced the judgment of the Court and authored the
plurality opinion in which Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton joined. Justices Frank-
furter and Jackson each filed separate concurrences. Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
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of speech, and, second, if it did, what its real meaning was. After
reviewing the 1917 Espionage Act opinions (with nary a notice of the
fact that they too involved indictments for conspiracy), the Chief
Justice concluded that Holmes and Brandeis were correct not only in
that series of cases, but also in their later dissent in Gitlow v. New
York, 7 8 where they contended that the clear and present danger test
must always be applied even under a criminal statute directly aimed at
speech.
79
Not surprisingly, Vinson found prevention of revolution a suffi-
ciently substantial governmental interest to warrant suppression of
speech (so stated, how could the conclusion be otherwise?)," ° and
determined that the probable success or failure of the conspiracy
could not be the relevant criterion for evaluating danger. Adopting
Learned Hand's modification of the Sckenck test in the court below,,"
the opinion moved quickly to the conclusion that the constitutional
requisites had been met. The conspirators' high degree of organization
and rigid discipline, together with "the inflammable nature of world
conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go
nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in
the very least ideologically attuned" combined to meet the require-
ments of the redefined clear and present danger test. 2
The next three sentences-the only ones in Vinson's opinion even
directed to the point-dealt with the fact that it was a conspiracy case
being decided: "And this analysis disposes of the contention that a
conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself,
cannot be constitutionally restrained . . . .It is the existence of the
conspiracy which creates the danger. If the ingredients of the reaction
are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is
78 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
79 See also the Brandeis-Holmes concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372 (1927). Vinson commented: "Although no case subsequent to Whitney and
Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt
that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." 341 U.S.
at 507. Although he did not share the position taken by Holmes and Brandeis, Frank-
furter noted in his own concurrence, that "it would be disingenuous to deny that the
dissent in Gitlow had been treated with the respect usually accorded to a decision." Id.
at 541. Whitney was finally expressly overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
so justice Black, a vigorous opponent of this so-called "balancing test" which would
weigh the government interest in abridgment against the interest in speech, saw the
"doctrine [as] ...capable of being used to justify almost any action Government may
wish to take to suppress First Amendment freedoms." Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 259, 262 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
81 In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger.
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
82 341 U.S. at 511.
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added."83 Strangely enough, except for Goldman v. United States,84 the
authorities relied upon were two non-speech criminal conspiracy cases
rather than any of the later series of World War I Espionage Act cases
of which Vinson's brief reasoning was so reminiscent. 85 The opinion
contained no substantive analysis of the elements of the crime and
nothing significant was said about intent, except to note in general
terms that it was required. There was no review of the evidence, al-
though the grant of certiorari went to the constitutionality of the Smith
Act as applied 8
Justice Frankfurter's lengthy concurring opinion did not discuss
the conspiracy question as such; it was devoted mainy to exposition
of his view that, given the Smith Act's explicit prohibitions on speech,
the question was not whether defendants' actions presented a clear and
present danger (a standard he viewed as unsatisfactory in any event),
but whether the legislature's statutory resolution of the conflict between
free speech and national security was a reasonable one. He concluded
that the congressional balancing embodied in the Smith Act was within
"the pale of fair judgment"87 and that the Act, whether wise or unwise,
was therefore constitutional.
The three remaining opinions, Justice Jackson's in concurrence,
and Justice Black's and Justice Douglas' in dissent, accorded special-
and contradictory-significance to the fact that the defendants had
been charged with conspiracy.
The dissents took objection to the very application of conspiracy
to speech crimes. Justice Black was in "basic disagreement" with the
Court and asserted his "fundamental difference in constitutional ap-
proach."88 The defendants "were not charged with an attempt to over-
throw the Government.... They were not even charged with saying
anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government.
The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish
certain ideas at a later date.., to use speech ... in the future to teach
and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government."'89 To Black
this was "a virulent form of prior censorship" forbidden by the first
83 Id. (citations omitted).
84 245 U.S. 474 (1918) ; see text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
85 In addition to Goldman, the Court cited only Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946), and United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915). The former involved
a conspiracy to violate federal tax laws and the latter a conspiracy to violate provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act. Interestingly, Rabinowich was the only conspiracy case cited in
Goldman. See note 44 supra.
86 340 U.S. 863 (1950).
87 341 U.S. at 540.
88 Id. at 579.
89 Id.
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amendment; to the extent the Smith Act authorized such a prosecution,
it was unconstitutional, as presumably would be all attempts to punish
conspiracies to commit crimes of speech. Even on the "radical assump-
tion" that the defendants could be punished "for the crime of actual
advocacy," although not indicted for it, affirmance would repudiate
the clear and present danger rule and "greatly restrict" first amend-
ment protections0 °
As unhappy as it might be to make speech itself a crime, the added
fillip of conspiracy made it only more offensive to Justice Douglas:
The vice of treating speech as the equivalent of overt acts of
a treasonable or seditious character is emphasized by a con-
curring opinion, which by invoking the law of conspiracy
makes speech do service for deeds which are dangerous to
society. The doctrine of conspiracy has served divers and op-
pressive purposes and in its broad reach can be made to do
great evil. But never until today has anyone seriously thought
that the ancient law of conspiracy could constitutionally be
used to turn speech into seditious conduct. Yet that is pre-
cisely what is suggested. I repeat that we deal here with
speech alone, not with speech plus acts of sabotage or un-
lawful conduct. Not a single seditious act is charged in the
indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because two
men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling
proportions. That course is to make a radical break with the
past and to violate one of the cardinal principles of our con-
stitutional scheme.91
For present purposes, justice Jackson's concurrence was perhaps
the most interesting opinion in Dennis. The initial question for Jackson
was whether the clear and present danger test should be applied to the
case before the Court. He concluded that it should not, but for reasons
wholly different from those of Frankfurter. His view was that the
doctrine had been devised for other purposes in an earlier era, and had
simply been outrun by the recent development of more sophisticated
revolutionary techniques.2 He cited particularly the Communist
90 Id. at 579-80.
91 Id. at 584.
92 Jackson did not urge that the clear and present danger test be discarded altogether.
He would "save it, unmodified, for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case
for which it was devised":
When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street comer, or
circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading by some zealots behind
a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not
beyond the capacity of the judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh
the necessary materials for decision whether it is a dear and present danger of
substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for the
danger in such cases has matured by the time of trial or it was never present.
The test applies and has meaning where a conviction is sought to be based
on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly advocate a crime but
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Party's reliance on a secret, tightly disciplined organization, infiltra-
tion of government and private groups, use of subtle propaganda, and
the like, none of which, he thought, were effectively subject to control
or limit by the more traditional legal methods utilized against anar-
chists, pacifists, socialists, and other, simpler radicals of the World
War I period and shortly thereafter 3 Though he would not sanction
use of the Holmes-Brandeis test, his reasons-ironically enough-
seemed to go to the very danger he perceived in the increased "subtlety
and efficacy of modernized revolutionary techniques used by totali-
tarian parties," 94 here obviously Communists. The distinction, then,
came down to several possibilities: that, in Jackson's view, the Com-
munist Party constituted an especially clear and present danger, an
intriguingly tautological approach; or that it, as a group, was to be
treated as sui generis; or that, as he went on to suggest more clearly,
there was simply no need to appraise the risk in a speech case when
the charge was conspiracy, thereby conveniently ignoring the fact that
the clear and present danger doctrine was itself developed in a series
of conspiracy cases.9 5
Jackson had no doubt whatsoever about what kind of case it was
or the sources that should be looked to for resolution of the issues:
What really is under review here is a conviction of con-
to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by construction or by im-
plication from external circumstances.
Id. at 568.
93 The problem was then, for Jackson, that "either by accident or design, the
Communist stratagem outwits the anti-anarchist pattern of statute aimed against 'over-
throw by force and violence' if qualified by the doctrine that only 'clear and present
danger' of accomplishing that result will sustain the prosecution." Id. at 567. Support
for the Jackson position can be found in 0. KcHmHEsm, PoLIncAL JUSTICE 140
(1961), where in discussing Dennis, the author declares the clear and present danger test
to be "obsolete," at least with respect to "Communist . . . activity." For a more lengthy
exposition of Justice Jackson's view of the danger and evils of the Communist party,
see his concurring opinion in American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
424-33 (1950).
94 341 U.S. at 567.
95 To support his rejection of the clear and present danger test, Jackson drew upon
non-speech conspiracy law, quoting from cases in the anti-trust area:
In conspiracy cases the Court not only has dispensed with proof of clear and
present danger but even of power to create a danger: "It long has been settled,
however, that a 'conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offense from the
crime that is the object of the conspiracy.' . . . Petitioners, for example, might
have been convicted here of a conspiracy to monopolize without ever having
acquired the power to carry out the object of the conspiracy. ... 
Having held that a conspiracy alone is a crime and its consummation is another,
it would be weird legal reasoning to hold that Congress could punish the one
only if there was "clear and present danger" of the second. This would compel the
Government to prove two crimes in order to convict for one.
341 U.S. at 576-77. Jackson seems quite wrong about the need to prove "two crimes."
Showing the existence of a "clear and present danger" of consummation is obviously not
the same as proving consummation. Beyond his familiar exposition of the rationale of
conspiracy, Jackson gave no reason for affording lesser protection to an agreement to
speak than to speech itself.
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spiracy, after a trial for conspiracy, on an indictment charg-
ing conspiracy, brought under a statute outlawing conspiracy.
With due respect to my colleagues, they seem to me to discuss
anything under the sun except the law of conspiracy. One of
the dissenting opinions even appears to chide me for "invok-
ing the law of conspiracy." As that is the case before us, it
may be more amazing that its reversal can be proposed with-
out even considering the law of conspiracy. 6
With the clear and present danger test out of the way, and the
remaining questions focused mainly in terms of conspiracy law, the
result readily followed; the assumptions underlying Jackson's applica-
tion of the conspiracy concepts to the speech area are worth setting
out:
The Constitution does not make conspiracy a civil right. The
Court has never before done so and I think it should not do so
now. Conspiracies of labor unions, trade associations, and
news agencies have been condemned, although accomplished,
evidenced and carried out, like the conspiracy here, chiefly
by letter-writing, meetings, speeches and organization. In-
deed, this Court seems, particularly in cases where the con-
spiracy has economic ends, to be applying its doctrines with
increasing severity. While I consider criminal conspiracy a
dragnet device capable of perversion into an instrument of
injustice in the hands of a partisan or complacent judiciary,
it has an established place in our system of law, and no
reason appears for applying it only to concerted action
claimed to disturb interstate commerce and withholding it
from those claimed to undermine our whole Government0 7
What is striking in Jackson's analysis is the failure to recognize
a distinction between conspiracy prosecutions in which the overt acts
are speeches or writings but where the combination has non-speech
objectives, and Dennis itself, in which the object of the alleged con-
spiracy was speech. He followed traditional reasoning about the in-
creased danger flowing from the existence of a combination whose
purpose is to effect unlawful ends and moved easily over the constitu-
tional problem raised by the fact that the ends, being speech, are
presumptively protected:
I do not suggest that Congress could punish conspiracy to
advocate something, the doing of which it may not punish ....
But it is not forbidden to put down force or violence, it is not
forbidden to punish its teaching or advocacy, and the end
96 Id. at 572.
97 Id.
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being punishable, there is no doubt of the power to punish
conspiracy for the purpose0 8
It is ironic that Jackson should have relied so heavily on the
common law conceptions of conspiracy and rejected the palpable rele-
vancy of the free speech line of cases. He, after all, had only two years
earlier authored the famous concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United
States,9 vigorously criticizing the evils and misuse of conspiracy
doctrine.
While not accepted by the Court, Jackson's analysis is nonetheless
significant-in part, because it illustrates the dangers of even a more
benign and somewhat less strict adaptation of conspiracy doctrine to
the speech area: to the extent that the conspiracy aspect of the case is
emphasized, the element of speech protection is almost inevitably
diminished. Moreover, apart from his rejection of the clear and present
danger test, Jackson articulated in honest detail the premises implicit
in the plurality opinion.
Justice Jackson was apparently troubled by the inchoate nature
of conspiracy. 00 It was possible, and perhaps even proper and useful,
to apply the clear and present danger test in the case of a "hot-headed
speech on a street corner," or in one involving "circulation of a few
incendiary pamphlets," because it was "not beyond the capacity of the
judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary ma-
terials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of sub-
stantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam."' In such instances
the effect of the speech can be judged because it has already oc-
curred. 10 2 As Jackson noted, "the danger in such cases has matured by
the time of trial or it was never present." 0 3 But when the crime is
charged in order to thwart future consequences, i.e., employed to prose-
cute a still unexecuted conspiracy, as Jackson apparently viewed
Dennis to be, then the attempt to measure the danger posed by the
combination is predictive; it is, as Jackson would have it, a "proph-
ecy."' 4 This recognition led Jackson not to retreat from the application
98 Id. at 575.
09 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949). Krulewitch was a prosecution for conspiracy to violate
the Mann Act.
100 justice Black evidenced a similar awareness, of course, by his categorization of
the case as one involving "prior censorship." 341 U.S. at 579.
101 Id. at 568. See also note 92 supra.
102 When that is true, of course, it is possible to allege actual incitement or
advocacy, itself, and there is no reason to rely on the conspiracy charge, either alone or
in a companion count. Jackson's earlier concurring opinion in Krulewitch, 336 U.S. 440,
445 (1949), specifically condemned unwarranted prosecutorial reliance on conspiracy
when a substantive charge alone would do.
103 341 U.S. at 568.
104 Id.
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of criminal sanctions in Dennis, but rather to reject the clear and
present danger test altogether. To be sure, he did speak of the par-
ticular dangers of the Communist Party, as he appraised them, but this
was not part of any attempt to measure the constitutional propriety
of punishment in the particular case (the purpose of the clear and
present danger doctrine). He was seeking to demonstrate the impro-
priety of using the Holmes-Brandeis test, or any like it. Thus, Jackson
recognized the tension between the concept of conspiracy as an inchoate
crime and any test focusing upon the immediacy of danger, but moved
from this awareness not to greater protection for first amendment rights
but instead to strict application of restrictive conspiracy doctrine.
Jackson reached the same result as did Chief Justice Vinson for
the plurality, but by a very different process of reasoning. Vinson
showed no conscious appreciation of the difficulty presented by the
treatment of conspiracy as an inchoate offense. He proceeded to apply
the test and measure the "danger," apparently drawing for his ap-
praisal upon judicially noticed "facts" and his own seemingly disposi-
tive predeliction toward weighing the risk of domestic communism
heavily.
The choice between Vinson and Jackson presents something of
a dilemma. If Justice Jackson's view as to the limited uses of the clear
and present danger test is to prevail, we are led to the imposition of
criminal sanctions for the planning of speech, which if actually uttered
might not itself be constitutionally punishable. 105 On the other hand, to
follow Vinson and apply the clear and present danger test in speech-
conspiracy cases may accomplish but little; it may do no more than
leave the door open to what Jackson properly characterizes as pro-
phetic judgments as to the impact of speech, judgments too often
exemplified by the kind of analysis, or lack of it, found in the World
War I Espionage Act cases and, indeed, in Dennis itself, judgments
that have no anchor in reliable forms of proof and are highly suscep-
tible to distortions born of popular fear and passion.
The very ease with which the plurality in Dennis could invoke the
threat of international communism and relate the case before the Court
to world conditions illustrates a subtle but important consequence of
the use of conspiracy. Applied to speech, it reinforces the tendency
105 This could be so if the speech failed to meet the requisite test, be it "dear and
present danger" either as stated by Holmes and Brandeis or as reformulated in Dennis,
or as suggested more recently by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) ("likely to incite or produce" imminent lawless action). It should be noted, of
course, that the Jackson rejection of the "clear and present danger" test (and
presumably of its variants as well) in a conspiracy case would give the prosecution a
ready means to avoid application of a potential impediment to conviction simply by
varying the charge from that of incitement or advocacy, to conspiracy to incite or
advocate, i.e., the Dennis formula.
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toward an escalated evaluation of the perceived risk. Once the con-
spiracy element is added-even where the speech has already oc-
curred-it becomes fairly simple for judges (or juries) to forget that
it is still speech being dealt with, not some mystical criminal combina-
tion. The charge in Dennis was not a conspiracy to engage in revolu-
tion, it was conspiracy to engage in speech, albeit its ultimate purpose
may or may not have been revolution. The distinction can readily turn
out to be elusive. In a later Communist Party case the Court described
Dennis as involving an "agreement to accomplish overthrow."'1°6 In
Dennis itself, the Vinson and Jackson opinions focused less on what
the defendants before the Court actually said than on the asserted
enormity of the danger posed by their ideology and their movement.
Where the charge is incitement, the Court must recognize that the
defendant's words are crucial to his criminality; with conspiracy there
is a shift in emphasis. Unlike the World War I cases, it appears in
Dennis that the measure of danger and its imminence were not tested
by the words of the several defendants, but by the vaguely described
threat of the communist conspiracy-domestic and global. Once the
standard is applied to the group and its shrouded purposes, not to the
speech itself, the way is opened to the most broadly based kind of judg-
ment, freed from whatever restraint there may be in linking the ap-
praisal of danger to the specific words of a specific defendant. The
increased opportunity for play of judicial predisposition is obvious. 7
Deference to first amendment interests and sensitivity to the con-
cerns which motivate treatment of speech rights as enjoying some
"preferred position" would strongly suggest the need for particular
examination of the reality of the danger posed by any specific speech-
conspiracy, rather than (as Jackson in Dennis suggests) wholesale and
uncritical acceptance of the mythology of group danger surrounding
conspiracy. The conjunction of speech and conspiracy tends toward too
ready a dilution of constitutional protections, both in conceptual and
pragmatic terms.
B. Yates
If Dennis exhibited a friendliness to the adoption, in speech-con-
spiracy cases, of the traditional doctrine that the fact of agreement is
l06Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324 (1957); see text accompanying note
108 infra.
1O7 0. KMCBHEZMRa, supra note 93, at 148, makes a similar point with respect to
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), which is discussed at text accompanying
notes 108-16 infra:
The Yates case shows how the potentiality of a revolutionary party can be
evaluated differently, according to whether its general mold and structure are
taken into account or whether judgment is based on evidence of specific action.
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itself enough for illegality, regardless of whether the conspiracy has
matured to the point of implementation, one of the later Communist
Party cases took some pains to limit the breadth of the implications
which could be drawn from the opinions of Chief Justice Vinson and
Justice Jackson. But the circumscription of Dennis had to wait six
years-until the paranoia and hysteria of the McCarthy era had abated
and until the accession of a new Chief Justice and a differently consti-
tuted Court. Writing for a four man majority in Yates v. United
States,08 reversing Smith Act conspiracy convictons, 09 Justice Harlan
noted a possible distinction between an executed and an executory
speech-conspiracy and expressly negatived the suggestion that the
Court in Dennis had spoken to the constitutional permissibility of
punishing a conspiracy to engage in future speech. He was first careful
to classify Dennis and prior Smith Act cases as ones which "involved
advocacy which had already taken place, and not advocacy still to
occur."" 0 Dennis' rejection of the argument "that a conspiracy to
advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitu-
tionally restrained, because it comprises only the preparation," and its
declaration that "it is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the
danger,""' had to be taken (according to Harlan) to refer to "more
than the basic agreement to advocate.""' Indeed, in his attempt to
- restrict Vinson's language, Harlan made it sound as if the charge in
Dennis had been conspiracy to overthrow and not conspiracy to advo-
cate overthrow:
The reference of the term "conspiracy," in context, was to an
agreement to accomplish overthrow at some future time, im-
plicit in the jury's findings under the instructions given,
rather than to an agreement to speak. Dennis was thus not
concerned with a conspiracy to engage at some future time
in seditious advocacy, but rather with a conspiracy to advo-
cate presently the taking of forcible action in the future. It
was action, not advocacy, that was to be postponed until "cir-
108 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
'
0 9 The defendants were charged, under the Act, with having conspired to advocate
and teach overthrow and to organize the Communist Party for the same purposes. The
convictions were reversed because of errors in the instructions to the jury and the case
remanded, but with a direction that acquittals be entered for five of the fourteen de-
fendants because, as to them, the evidence was "palpably insufficient" to show either the
requisite specific intent or their membership in the conspiracy charged. The Government
never retried the other nine. For a recounting of the subsequent history of prosecutions
under the Act, see W. GELLmoaw, A rxca RIGHoTs 82 (1960) and Mollan, Smith Act
Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U. PirT. L. Rnv. 705
(1965).
110 354 U.S. at 323.
111 341 U.S. at 511.
112 354 U.S. at 323.
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cumstances" would "permit." We intimate no views as to
whether a conspiracy to engage in advocacy in the future,
where speech would thus be separated from action by one
further remove, is punishable under the Smith Act'
13
Although Harlan's suggestion of a distinction between a prosecu-
tion for a conspiracy to advocate in which the advocacy had already
occurred, and one in which the advocacy had yet to take place," 4 was
framed in terms of possible statutory construction, rather than as a
matter of constitutional compulsion, he was probably mindful of the
additional difficulties of sustaining under the first amendment a con-
viction for conspiracy based on words not yet spoken. Indeed, the
very need for a line between the two types of situations-present and
future advocacy-was sharpened by yet another aspect of Yates. One
ground for reversal of the convictions in Yates was that the instruc-
tions of the trial court did not sufficiently articulate for the jury the
difference between mere advocacy of doctrine, which was legal,
even if done with evil motive, and advocacy of action, which if coupled
with the requisite intent, was fully punishable. While this holding was
also couched in terms of the intended reach of the Smith Act,115 its
constitutional resonance was unmistakable. Any doubt that the point
was based on the first amendment was subsequently dispelled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio.16
Yates' insistence that there be "urging of action" (that the listen-
ers be urged to "do something .. . rather than merely to believe in
something")," 1 or use of the "language of incitement""' or language
which has a "tendency to generate action ' 9 would seem to make the
113Id. at 324. But in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), decided four years
later, Harlan, as spokesman for the Court, suggested that even a conspiracy to engage
in future advocacy might be punishable under the Act. See text accompanying note 127
infra.
114 To be sure, Harlan may have been attempting to distinguish between an un-
executed conspiracy to advocate, with the actual advocacy imminent, and one to advocate
at some indefinite time in the future, rather than to draw a line between cases in which
the advocacy had already occurred and one which it had not, even if immediately im-
pending. The latter distinction seems both more tenable and more likely, not only in
terms of probable constitutional dimension, but because of Harlan's insistence only a
few sentences earlier on the fact that Dennis and the earlier Smith Act cases involved
already-accomplished advocacy.
115 See 354 U.S. at 318-19.
116 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg held unconstitutional an Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute on the express ground that it failed to distinguish between advocacy
of action and of doctrine, the distinction enunciated in Yates.
117 354 U.S. at 325.
118 Id. at 321 (quoting Dennis).
119 Id. at 320. Four years later, in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961),
sustaining a conviction under the "membership" clause of the Smith Act, Justice Harlan,
again writing for the Court, described the Yates standard as requiring that the advocacy
be "uttered in terms reasonably calculated to 'incite' to such overthrow." 367 U.S. at 230.
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precise phrasing of the defendant's speech crucial to any determination
of criminality. Without such a focus, indeed perhaps without scrutiny
of the exact words, one cannot possibly determine whether or not the
exhortations fit the Yates description. While one could, of course, argue
that the issue in the conspiracy context is not the language actually
used, but the words which the defendants intended to use (an elusive
inquiry at best) this seems patently inconsistent with Yates' effort to
assure careful delineation of the proscribable area of speech and its
explicit and emphatic rejection of the lower court's view which would
have had evil motive do the work of "words of action" by allowing
conviction for otherwise permissible advocacy so long as coupled with
specific intent to accomplish overthrow. Moreover, it ignores the very
real possibility that the defendant would never have actually spoken
the words he is charged with intending. Perhaps most importantly, it
augments intrusion upon the constitutionally protected area of speech.
Unless one is willing to give controlling significance to the well-worn
dogma about the measurably increased dangers of combination, it is
difficult to understand why-as Justice Jackson would have had it in
Dennis-an agreement to make a speech which exists only in the
defendants' minds is entitled to less protection than a speech which
has actually been delivered.
C. Membership Cases
In Scales v. United States"0 and Noto v. United States,' both
decided the same day, the Court had occasion to consider the constitu-
tionality and application of the "membership" clause of the Smith Act
which in terms made it a crime to become "a member" of "any society,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the
overthrow or destruction" of the government by force and violence,
"knowing the purposes thereof."' 22 In opinions again written by Justice
Harlan, the Court sustained the conviction of Scales but, on evi-
dentiary grounds, reversed that of Noto. The decisions are significant
because of the close analogy between criminal conspiracy and the
proscription of membership in an organization because of its assertedly
illegal objectives. The Court recognized the parallel and nodded to
the obviously heightened constitutional obstacles inhering in the fact
that the organization affected was one purporting to be a political party,
a factor equally present but left unremarked in Dennis. Still, Harlan
had no great difficulty in sustaining the validity of the membership
120 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
121367 U.S. 290 (1961).
1
2 2 See note 76 supra.
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clause. First, the Court imputed to the statute a requirement that the
proscribed membership be more than passive; in addition to knowing of
the organization's illegal activities, and specifically intending to further
them, the defendant must have been an "active" participant in the
affairs of the group. This limitation was watered down, however, by the
notation that it was enough to prove such activity in connection with
"general Party affairs," not necessarily the specifically illegal activ-
ities.' 3
These prerequisites to conviction-knowledge, specific intent, and
active membership-were taken to be enough, in combination, to defeat
not only the first amendment claim of Scales, 124 but his argument that
membership was an insufficiently substantial relationship to meet fifth
amendment-due process concepts of "personal guilt.,' Justice Harlan
cited "familiar concepts of the law of conspiracy and complicity" to
dispel the "thought that due process puts beyond the reach of the
criminal law all individual associational relationships, unless accom-
panied by the commission of specific acts of criminality."'
125
123 See 367 U.S. at 223 n.15:
The element of "activity" in the proscribed membership stands apart from the
ingredient of guilty "knowledge" in that the former may be shown by a de-
fendant's participation in general Party affairs, whereas the latter requires linking
him with the organization's illegal activities.
124 Because Dennis had held that advocacy of the type in question was not protected
and that "combination [conspiracy] to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of
what purports to be a political party," was punishable, 367 U.S. at 228-29, what followed
in Scales required no great advance in reasoning. It seemed almost a foregone conclusion
that the Court would "discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purpose-
ful form of complicity in a group engaging in the same forbidden advocacy, should
receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment." Id. at
229. The potential chill on exercise of speech rights by virtue of threatened prosecutions
under the statute was seen as limited or non-existent because of the knowledge and
specific intent requirements:
If it is said that the mere existence of such an enactment tends to inhibit the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights, in that it engenders an unhealthy
fear that one may find himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability, the
answer surely is that the statute provides that a defendant must be proven to
have knowledge of the proscribed advocacy before he may be convicted....
The clause does not make criminal all association with an organization which
has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy. There must be dear proof
that a defendant "specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organiza-
tion] by resort to violence."
Id. at 229 (footnotes omitted). Scales did not discuss the applicability of the "clear and
present danger" test "as both sides appear to agree that [it] . . . reaches the member-
ship clause of the Smith Act, and since the petition for certiorari tenders no issue as to the
method of applying it . ... " Id. at 230 n.21.
125 Id. at 225. The imputation of individual guilt on the basis of a defined relation-
ship to other persons or to an organized group could, of course, find general grounding
in the law of conspiracy. But there were differences between the case at hand and the
usual conspiracy, and Justice Harlan therefore thought it fit to explore somewhat more
fully the exactness of the parallel. There was the obvious question of what could actually
be read into the fact of membership:
It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an
illegal organization by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than
signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing,
on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the
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Noto re-emphasized the need for strict proof of all elements of the
membership offense as protection against sweeping innocent sympa-
thizers within the net of criminality. 2 ' But the reversal on evidentiary
grounds provided but slight counterpoint to the resolution of the larger
constitutional issues in Scales. And Harlan included a curious passage
in the Court's opinion; it was almost too casual in light of his carefully
worded opinion in Yates where he had specifically reserved the question
of illegality of a conspiracy to advocate in the future:
... there is no evidence that such acts of sabotage were pres-
ently advocated; and it is present advocacy and not an intent
to advocate in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the
future ... which is an element of the crime under the mem-
bership clause. To permit an inference of present advocacy
from evidence showing at best only a purpose or a conspiracy
to advocate in the future would be to allow the jury to blur
the lines of distinction between the various offenses punishable
under the Smith Act.'
27
It is not clear whether this suggestion that a conspiracy to advocate
in the future would be punishable under other sections of the Smith
Act represents a conscious repudiation of the studied neutrality ex-
pressed in Yates.
And thus, with the Scales-Noto ascription of conspiracy-like lia-
bility to membership in an organized political group arguably possessed
of both legal and illegal aims, the stage was finally set for the legal con-
frontation with Dr. Spock's more informal group of political actors.
knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed
be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete,
practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a
commitment on the part of a conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise.
A member, as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a
criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby neces-
sarily committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.
Id. at 227-28. It is difficult to be sure whether, by the time it finished, the Court had
made less or more out of "membership" than of conspiracy. In any event, notwith-
standing its putative distinctions, the only real difference in conception between tradi-
tional conspiracy and illegal membership under the Smith Act-given the latter's
requirement of knowledge and specific intent-seemed to be substitution of the element
of "active membership" for the usually required "agreement." On a more practical level,
it was doubtful whether all the procedural advantages available to the prosecution in a
conspiracy case would attach equally under an indictment for membership. And cer-
tainly, it was not insignificant that the Act, in terms, and as Harlan read it, required that
the illegal advocacy already have occurred. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
126 [The requisite criminal intent] must be judged strictissimi juris, for otherwise
there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an
organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to
violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally
protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does
not necessarily share.
367 U.S. at 299-300.
127 Id. at 298-99 (emphasis partially added).
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VI. THE Spock CASE
The government prosecution in United States v. Spock2'2 once
again presented-this time against the backdrop of the Vietnamese
war-the conflict between the government's pursuit of an alleged
conspiracy and the claim of indicted defendants to first amendment
protection. Dr. Benjamin Spock and three others,129 Rev. William
Sloane Coffin, Jr., Michael Ferber, and Mitchell Goodman, were con-
victed under a single count indictment under section 12 of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967.130 The charge was that the defendants,
along with others, had conspired to "counsel, aid and abet" draft regis-
trants to "evade [military] service ... and all other duties required" of
them under the Universal Military Training and Service Act and to
"hinder and interfere ... with the administration"'-3 of that Act.
The court of appeals set out the salient events upon which the
prosecutions were based:
As is well known, the war in Vietnam and the draft to
support it have engendered considerable animosity and frus-
tration. In August 1967 a number of academic, clerical, and
professional persons discussed the need of more vigorous
opposition to governmental policies. From their eventually
consolidated efforts came a document entitled "A Call to
Resist Illegitimate Authority" (hereinafter the Call) and a
cover letter requesting signatures and support. The letter was
signed by defendant Dr. Benjamin Spock and defendant Rev.
William Sloane Coffin, Jr., and two other persons. The Call
was originally signed by them, numerous others, and event-
ually by hundreds. The defendant Mitchell Goodman had
been preparing a somewhat similar statement against the war
and the draft. In mid-September he learned of the Call, which
he also signed. He, Coffin, Spock and others spoke on October
2 at a press conference in New York City to launch the Call.
It was there announced by Goodman that further activities
were contemplated, including a nationwide collection of draft
cards and a ceremonial surrender thereof to the Attorney
General. On October 16 a draft card burning and turn-in
took place at the Arlington Street Church in Boston, arranged
by the defendant Michael Ferber, and participated in by
Coffin. Four days afterwards all four defendants attended a
demonstration in Washington, in the course of which an un-
successful attempt was made to present the fruits of that
collection and similar gatherings to the Attorney General.
32
128 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
129 A fifth defendant, Marcus Raskin, was acquitted in the trial court.
13050 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
131 416 F.2d at 168.
132 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The court reversed all of the convictions because the trial court,
in addition to asking for a general verdict, had erred by putting a
series of "special questions" to the jury. Finding the evidence insuffi-
cient as to two of the defendants (Spock and Ferber), the court
ordered their acquittal, but left the way open to retrial of the remaining
pair (Goodman and Coffin). Neither side sought further review and
the government, for undisclosed reasons of its own, chose not to exer-
cise its option to reprosecute. Thus, the case ended with no clear victor
and we are left, as Professor Packer has said, with a decision that was
"unsatisfactory (to both sides) .'133 The First Circuit opinions-
majority and dissent-are indeed troublesome, though each attempted
to grapple seriously with the contending claims.
A. The Majority's "Safeguards"
The Spock case raised a number of important issues. The first, and
underlying one, was the fundamental first amendment question of the
extent to which men may go in voicing their opposition to government
policy and in supporting and in encouraging others-in this case, draft
resisters-who would act, even illegally, in personal protest. Here the
majority of the court of appeals predictably followed constitutional
precedents calling for a weighing of the governmental interest and
allowing the proscription of words that incite to illegal action. Chief
Judge Aldrich, writing for himself and Judge McEntee, based his anal-
ysis on the assumption that the defendants' "ultimate" objective of
expressing opposition to the war and to the draft was legal, but that
"the means or intermediate objectives encompassed both legal and
illegal activity." 34 This underlying premise-that the concert of the
parties was "bifarious," as the court called it, an "intertwining of legal
and illegal aspects"' 35-- presaged the conclusion. Once the question
was framed in terms of whether "illegal" speech activity was protected,
the result seemed inevitable. There was no question for the court but
that there was power to punish "those who increase the likelihood of
crime by concerted action." 38 And to talk of utilizing "less restrictive
alternatives," such as prosecution for commission of the substantive
offense when and if it occurred, simply "ignore [d] the potency of con-
spiratorial conduct; to wait for the substantive offense may be to wait
too long. Congress has a right to prefer registrants to felons."' 137 For
the majority, the constitutional judgment lay in "comparing the ...
133 Packer, The Conspiracy Weapon, in TETAs or = RImSSTANCE 170, 171 (1970).
134 416 F.2d at 169.
185 Id.
136 Id. at 171.
1S7 ld.
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private and public interests," with the latter to prevail unless "insub-
stantial." Since the "maintenance of an army in peacetime [sic] is a
valid, in fact vital, governmental function,"' 38 deterrence of the sub-
stantive offense and prosecution of the conspiracy were permissible.
The requirements of Dennis and Yates were satisfied by the fact
that the defendant's objectives all lay in the present, not the future,
and any doubt as to either the imminency or the probability of accom-
plishment was stilled by brief mention of what the court called the
"circumstances":
The existence of a large number of young men, perhaps im-
pressionable, and in any event oriented in defendants' direc-
tion by natural self-interest, adequately distinguishes this case
from Wood v. Georgia and Bridges v. California. In this con-
text, the "soft sell" may be the most telling. 39
The court gave only this much and no more for the "clear and present
danger" test-in any form or variation.
The specific problem in Spock, of course, was not whether men
can be punished for what they say, but whether they can be punished
for what they agree to say, that is, whether the conspiracy sanction
ought to be available to the government to prosecute a combination
whose means or objectives are speech activity. The majority opinion
in Spock discussed this issue, but only in conclusory and traditional
form, invoking the usual rhetoric surrounding conspiracy. The result
was the customary adoption of conspiracy concepts-almost whole-
sale-into the speech area, without significant distinction between
kinds of conspiracies. The premises predetermined the result in a
manner not dissimilar from the World War I Espionage Act cases or
the Communist Party cases. To be sure, for a brief paragraph or so, the
court noted the potential for unfairness and abuse in the usually loose
evidentiary rules governing conspiracy, but having alluded to the
problem, it clearly prohibited government advantage only in a narrow
area-with respect to intent, which is but one of a variety of crucial
trial issues in the conspiracy case.1
40
138 Id.
139Id. at 172 (footnotes omitted). Wood, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), and Bridges, 314 U.S.
252 (1941), were both decisions invoking the clear and present danger test to overturn
convictions for contempt of court.
140 In a somewhat confusing passage, the court declared that there had been a
"fundamental error in the government's approach" to the case. It was "improper" to
adopt the "panoply of rules applicable to a conspiracy having purely illegal purposes"
and to utilize the "statements of third parties alleged to be co-conspirators.... The
metastatic rules of ordinary conspiracy are at direct variance with the principle of
strictissimi juris." 416 F.2d at 173. But if the words reflected a sense of the threat to
first amendment freedoms inherent in the application of the usual evidentiary rules of
conspiracy to cases involving speech, the context left it highly doubtful that the court
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The attempt to explain why it would not suffice to allow the gov-
ernment to prosecute only those who had actually engaged in illegal
advocacy, counselling, or aiding and abetting, was essentially unsatisfy-
ing. Congress certainly does have the right to "prefer registrants to
felons" but to leap from this to a conclusory allusion to the "potency
of conspiratorial conduct" leaves a gap unfilled by intervening reason-
ing. It may indeed be that the "government's ability to deter and
punish those who increase the likelihood of crime by concerted action
has long been established," but it does not follow from this tradition
that there should be an uncritical transfer of conspiracy doctrine into
the area of speech crimes.
Perhaps it is too much to expect that a lower federal court would
challenge directly the basic approaches taken in the World War I and
Communist Party cases. Thus, a fairer appraisal of Spock may turn
on an examination of the majority's more limited effort, its attempt to
frame standards to distinguish the culpable from the guiltless in the
context of a conspiracy that serves both legal and illegal purposes. As in
Scales, the "mixed motives" of the defendants and the consequent in-
volvement of the first amendment were seen "merely [to] present a
more difficult problem of insuring that the government does not use
its procedural advantages to expand the strict elements of the of-
fense."'' The way to meet this "problem" was to take from Scales the
requirement that the essential criminal intent be proven and judged
strictly. The court elucidated the methods by which the "strictissimi
juris" test of Scales and Noto could be met:
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political
within the shadow of the First Amendment, we hold that an
individual's specific intent to adhere to the illegal portions
may be shown in one of three ways: by the individual de-
fendant's prior or subsequent unambiguous statements; by
the individual defendant's subsequent commission of the very
illegal act contemplated by the agreement; or by the indi-
vidual defendant's subsequent legal act if that act is "clearly
undertaken for the specific purpose of rendering effective the
later illegal activity which is advocated."
42
Utilization of these tests would fully protect innocent participants in
was proposing radical surgery. Though the majority said that the statements of one
defendant could not be used to prove the specific intent of another, it was far from
clear that third-party statements could not be used for other purposes, e.g., to show the
existence of an agreement or the illegality of the defendants' means or objectives. Because
reversal was required in any event, the court was excused from the obligation to detail
the extent to which the government's use of co-conspirators' statements may actually
have been prejudicial.
14 1 Id. at 172.
142 Id. at 173 (quoting Scales).
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the proper purposes of the agreement and would respond to the "legiti-
mate apprehension... that the evil must be separable from the good
without inhibiting legitimate association in an orderly society." '143
Judge Coffin's dissent rejected the reality of the protection
afforded; it tellingly criticized the kinds of proof which the majority
suggested for showing the requisite intent:
What are the implications of the three methods of
activating one's signature to the "Call" to status as a full-
fledged conspirator? To say that prior or subsequent unam-
biguous statements change the color of the litmus is to say
that while one exercise of First Amendment rights is pro-
tected, two are not. To say that actual commission of illegal
acts (i.e., encouraging turning in or burning draft cards-not
specifically described in the "Call") renders culpable the more
opaque original "agreement" is to say simply that the subse-
quent commission of one crime becomes suddenly the com-
mission of two crimes. To say that "subsequent legal acts
clearly undertaken for rendering effective the advocated
illegal action" [my emphasis] renders retrospectively con-
spiratorial the earlier protected ambiguous advocacy is to say
that two rights make a wrong. For example, were the janitor
of Arlington Church to have signed the "Call" and subse-
quently to have volunteered his services to tidy the pews for
the turn-in, he would have metamorphosed into a con-
spirator.144
The effect of the court's "delayed fuse approach to determining . . .
conspiratorial culpability" was correctly perceived by Judge Coffin
as creating a "pronounced chilling effect-indeed that of a sub-zero
blast-on all kinds of efforts to sway public opinion."' 4
Even setting aside its inhibiting effects, the majority's approach
seemed inadequate to accomplish the intended purpose. The immediate
test of the court's standards came in their application to the case at
hand; Spock had to be acquitted, according to the majority, because
under the strictissimi standard there was insufficient proof to warrant
an inference of his specific intent to adhere to the illegal portions of the
agreement. That he had signed and helped draft the Call, and, indeed,
had been one of the four signatories of the cover letter with which it
was circulated, did not "evidence the necessary intent to adhere to its
illegal purposes." Neither did his statement to a government agent that
he was willing to do "anything" asked to further opposition to the war
meet the test, for "specific intent is not established by such a general-
143 Id.
144 Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
145 Id. at 188.
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ization."'140 Spock had attended and spoken at the Washington demon-
stration, though he played no role in the turn-in of draft cards either
there or at the Arlington Street Church in Boston earlier. His speech
was characterized as "limited to condemnation of the war and the draft,
and lacked any words ... of counselling. The jury could not find pro-
scribed advocacy from the mere fact, which he freely admitted, that
he hoped the frequent stating of his views might give young men
'courage to take active steps in draft resistance.' This is a natural
consequence of vigorous speech," the court noted.147
Even if one is disposed to admire the court's restraint in refusing
to affirm Spock's conviction, an examination of the basis on which
contrary conclusions were reached as to Coffin and Goodman leaves a
sense of more than vague unease. Coffin was also an originator of the
Call, but the court chose to emphasize two other factors as sufficient
to permit a different result than that mandated for Spock. First, Coffin
had participated in the turn-in of draft cards in Boston and "this
participation and assistance could well have been found to be aiding
and abetting non-possession, a crime under the Selective Service Act."
The significance of this conduct was that "because it was the very
type of resistance that the agreement might have been found to contem-
plate, a properly instructed jury could find that Coffin had the requisite
specific intent." '148 Why the fact that Coffin may have been guilty of
another crime made him convictable for conspiracy was not otherwise
explained. Moreover, Ferber, who had arranged the Boston rally, had
also assisted in the burning and surrender of draft cards on that occa-
sion, but the meaning for him was inexplicably different than the same
activity had been for Coffin. 49 A second distinction the court seemed
to seek to draw between Spock, on the one hand, and Coffin and
Goodman, on the other, was that the latter pair had actually engaged
in illegal counselling; their speeches-and indeed Goodman's own
tract-had gone beyond what the court described as Spock's general
denunciations of the war and the draft. The relevance of this too would
be more understandable if the defendants had been charged with
counselling or aiding and abetting instead of conspiracy.
Given the specific differences that can be identified, it appears
that Spock was acquitted because, unlike Goodman and Coffin, he
neither personally engaged in what the court was willing to consider
146 Id. at 178.
147 Id. at 178-79.
148 Id. at 178.
149 Ferber's acquittal was based on the court of appeals' conclusion that while he
may have "engaged in a smaller conspiracy," he did not become part of the larger one
which the government proved. See id. at 179,
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illegal counselling or aiding and abetting, nor gave any express indica-
tion of evil intent sufficient to satisfy the court. This result presents
both theoretical and practical difficulties.
In holding that Coffin and Goodman could properly have been
found guilty of conspiracy because they had committed another crime,
the court belies its own stated assumption that the conspiracy indict-
ment is necessary to thwart incipient or inchoate offenses. The pair
could just as well have been charged with the discrete offenses of coun-
selling or of aiding and abetting and it is difficult to know why such
prosecutions would not have adequately protected the government's
legitimate interests. 150 But the court treated these other offenses as
relevant only on the issue of intent. The unmistakable implication is
that, given other sufficient evidence of intent and illegal purpose, con-
viction could have rested on proof of the agreement alone, without need
to show that any actual illegal counselling (incitement) or aiding and
abetting had occurred. Such traditional conspiracy logic-dispensing
with the need for any illegal conduct beyond the agreement itself-
would allow conviction before the defendants had done anything more
than merely agree to speak in the future, that is, even before drafting
of the Call, much less its issuance, and before the Boston and Washing-
ton demonstrations. The unexamined constitutional problems which
inhere in such a view are many and substantial. In any event it is cer-
tainly fair to doubt whether the First Circuit would allow a conviction
to stand on such a set of facts, even if the existence of the agreement
and the intent were clear; and in no event, it seems, would the court
have upheld such a conviction without a much more careful analysis
of the constitutional difficulties than it exhibited in the Spock opinion.
Examination of the other putative distinction between Spock and
the non-acquitted defendants is also troublesome. To the extent Coffin
and Goodman were the unwilling victims of their own explicit declara-
tions of intent or purpose, the court leaves a situation in which, after
its decision, only one untutored in the law would expose himself to
conviction. The implication from comparison of Spock with Goodman
and Coffin is that had the latter two defendants been only slightly more
cautious in use of a few key words or sentences, they might have
escaped conviction on the conspiracy charge altogether. While the
meaning of speech does indeed depend on the words used, the context
150 The availability of alternative means of protecting the government's interest
without restricting speech to such a great extent is highly relevant to the constitutional
propriety of use of the conspiracy prosecution. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969). The dissent in Spck raised the point, but obviously failed to
persuade the majority.
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cannot be irrelevant. Criminality ought not to turn on one's subtlety
in avoiding the use of particular phraseology, while conveying substan-
tially the same meaning. If the strictissimi standard does require such
explicitness and precludes resolution of any ambiguity against the de-
fendant, it becomes comparatively easy to escape conviction whatever
the unuttered intent. Conversely, to allow an inference of specific
intent to be drawn from words of lesser clarity, or from more general
statements would seem to defeat the court's very purpose in eliciting
the strict test. A less wooden standard would seem to have compelled
the court to allow resubmission of Spock's guilt to another jury, along
with that of Coffin and Goodman. In sum, it is hard to see how the
court's rule can work to protect the innocent without also insulating the
guilty, but sophisticated; or how it can reach the latter without also
jeopardizing the former.
It is possible, of course, to venture another, "psychological" ex-
planation of the court's rather strained efforts to distinguish among
the defendants. On the one hand, the court was doubtless sensitive to
the first amendment interests at stake and to the fact that the defen-
dants were far from being ordinary criminals. Yet, it may have felt
itself trapped, together with Coffin and Goodman, by those defendants'
own words-by their explicit or near explicit declarations of intent to
counsel and to aid and abet draft resisters to violate the Selective
Service law. Moreover, Coffin's direct challenge to the government to
prosecute him may have left the court uncomfortable at the prospect
of allowing the defendants, on appeal, to deny the literal meaning of
their own declarations and belatedly to give them another, more inno-
cent cast. Judges Aldrich and McEntee may thus have felt bound to do
no less than to take the defendants at their word. At least they may
have thought themselves precluded from denying the jury an oppor-
tunity to do so."' The result nonetheless was one that fairly invited
the dissent's comment that the court's acquittal of Spock and Ferber
was "the product of its own generosity rather than the inevitable
result of its rationale. ' 152 But for precedential purposes, at least,
speculation as to the wellsprings of the court's motivation is less signifi-
cant than its articulated legal structure.
At bottom, there remains the strong sense that there was little if
anything to justify finding significant differences in intent among the
151 Thus, at one point, the court declared "we do not think of Coffin as one to run
with the hare and hold with the hounds," 416 F.2d at 178; in like tone, it also noted
that Coffin and Goodman had "publicly asserted that they were placing their own necks
on the block" and that they "should not now be heard to say that no axe was involved,"
id. n.29.
52 Id. at 191,
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four convicted defendants. The court's disparate conclusions as to the
various defendants provided little in the way of reliable guidance for
the future-either to other courts in other cases, or, even more im-
portantly, to other dissenters in other situations. This is no small failing
in a constitutional area in which certainty is to be especially prized;
there is no virtue in creation of a penumbra of vagueness around the
first amendment. The objective should be to maximize the area of
permissible and freely exercisable expression, not to deter and keep
people well clear of the line of illegality.
C. The Dissent's Test
While the majority asked whether there was "reason or authority
barring prosecutions for public conspiracy in the speech-opinion field,"
and answered that question in the negative, the issue for Judge Coffin,
in dissent, was whether application of conspiracy doctrine was com-
pelled in such a case. The dissent placed primary emphasis on the
threat to expression and association and, as noted, found the majority's
ostensible safeguards inadequate to their purpose. For Judge Coffin,
then, all of the convictions should have been reversed and acquittals
directed for all the defendants because use of conspiracy doctrine was
"not compelled by conspiracy precedents, not consistent with First
Amendment principles, not required to deal effectively with the hazard
to public security, and not capable of discriminating application as
between the culpable and the innocent."' 53
Despite the breadth of his disagreement with the majority, Judge
Coffin stopped short of saying that "the law should recognize no overt
conspiracy in the sensitive area of public discussion and opinion.'' 54
To do that, he thought, would go "too far"; it would allow the public
nature of the group to "confer an immunity both on nefarious joint
undertakings and absolute protection to criminal enterprise not vouch-
safed by the First Amendment even for individual speech."15 Giving
heavy emphasis to the openness of the combination before him, he
pointed to five characteristics as distinguishing the alleged conspiracy
in Spock from the combinations presented in the other speech and non-
speech cases upon which the majority had relied:
Here we confront a "conspiracy" where (1) the effort was
completely public; (2) the issues were all in the public
domain; (3) the group was ill-defined, shifting, with many
153 Id. at 184.
154 1d. at 185.
1 Id.
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affiliations; (4) the purposes in the "agreement" are both
legal and illegal; and (5) the need for additional evidence to
inculpate-notwithstanding the absence of a statutory re-
quirement for an overt act-is recognized. 5 6
It is true, of course, that openness is hardly a typical feature of
the usual criminal conspiracy, but as the majority responded, lack of
secrecy is not alone enough to warrant immunity, especially where
achievement of the conspirators' objectives requires some public com-
munication. What, then, does the public nature of the group's actions
suggest? Certainly, the government could be, and presumably was,
aware of the assertedly subverting actions of the defendants. In some
cases, this might allow it to take appropriate non-prosecutorial steps
to forestall the objectionable consequences. It is not apparent, how-
ever, that immediately effective alternatives were available to the gov-
ernment in the Spock situation. 
57
The dissent also suggested that, given its "openness," the putative
"danger" or "threat" posed by the conspiracy was diminished. That,
of course, may be so. But the accuracy of the assertion neither was self-
evident in the Spock case itself, nor will it invariably be true. To the
extent that the group is engaged in speech-in an attempt to per-
suade-its very strength and potential effect may well depend on its
success in securing wide dissemination of its message. Thus, in many
instances, the open nature of the efforts may enhance the apprehended
danger. Conversely, the absence of public notice of the conspirators'
actions, when directed to speech, may be more a function of their in-
effectiveness and the consequent insignificance of the threat they pose,
than of anything else. Moreover, there is often an obvious relationship
between the notoriety of the "conspirators" and the extent of public
attention accorded their speech or actions. Accordingly, the "public-
ness" criterion may tend toward protection of those who are least in
need of it. While the Spock case hardly illustrates the point, it is per-
haps the relatively impotent and powerless who more often become
victims of government suppression.
To be sure, Judge Coffin was probably directing his remarks to the
fact that the defendants made no effort at concealment, rather than to
the fact that their activities were widely known. But, again, this seems
an inadequate base on which to rest a constitutional distinction. The
156 Id. at 186.
5 
5 Of course it is always open to the government to rebut the defendants' speech,
i.e., to enter the '"market place of ideas." More specifically, it is conceivable that if the
problem were thought acute, Congress could have been asked to increase the penalties
for draft evasion.
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attempt to maintain secrecy of identity in the political or speech area
is as likely a consequence of fear of reprisal as of illegal purpose 58
The open character of the activity does, of course, emphasize the
constitutional interests at stake. To the extent that the conspiracy is
"public" it is likely to contribute to the general political dialogue, to
the "market place of ideas," and thus even more obviously serve the
very core interests the first amendment was intended to foster. The
focus is the same with respect to Judge Coffin's points that the "issues
[to which the alleged conspiracy was directed] were all in the public
domain," that the agreement, if any, had both "legal and illegal" pur-
poses,' 59 and that the membership of the "conspiracy," was shifting
and ill-defined as is typical of politically oriented groupings. These are
all factors which testify both to the political nature of the case and the
importance of casting the rule in favor of allowing the speech. It does
not follow, however, that the propriety of the charge of conspiracy in
speech cases should turn on the extent to which the issues have already
become public, or on the extent to which the participants are well-
organized, have shown a readiness to go before a large audience, or an
ability to reach a broad segment of the public. Use of conspiracy doc-
trine would seem neither more nor less proper, for example, in the case
of a small, cohesive group composed of a few individuals distributing
anonymous leaflets in an attempt to alert readers to previously unrec-
ognized issues. Concentrating as he does, on the particular aspects of
the campaign conducted by the Spock group, Judge Coffin's tests seem
inadequate to establish justifiable distinctions among various kinds of
speech conspiracies.
VI. CONSPIRACY AND SPEECH CRIMES: SoM CONCEPTUAL
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The courts, as it thus appears, have upheld use of conspiracy to
prosecute for past illegal utterances while citing reasons for its use as
an inchoate offense. At the same time, they have failed to perceive the
difficulties of applying first amendment standards where projected or
future advocacy has not yet occurred. Of course, Justice Jackson writ-
158 To fail to take account of the need for self-protective secrecy felt by those who
disseminate unpopular ideas seems inconsistent with Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960), in which the Supreme Court held invalid, on its face, a California statute which
banned distribution of anonymous political literature. The Court's clear recognition of
the interest in circulation of ideological or political tracts unidentified as to individual
source tends to undercut, somewhat, one possible rationale of Coffin's distinction. See also
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
But cf. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), in which the Court avoided the need
to reaffirm and apply, or reject Talley by finding the absence of a case or controversy.
159 416 F.2d at 186.
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ing in Dennis, seemed to recognize the difficulty, but used it as a basis
for rejecting the then applicable constitutional test; having touched the
problem, he left speech the clear loser.
The other possible exception may be Yates, in which Justice Har-
lan sought expressly to reserve the question of constitutional propriety
of a conviction involving a conspiracy to advocate in the future and to
limit the broad language of Vinson in Dennis ascribing criminality to
the conspiratorial agreement alone. Harlan emphasized that both Den-
nis and Yates involved advocacy which had already taken place. But
even this seeming reticence to carry conspiracy doctrine to the limits of
its logic was apparently either forgotten or overcome by the time Har-
lan wrote for the Court in Noto and suggested that some provisions of
the Smith Act reached the still executory agreement. Yates itself con-
tained language by Harlan seemingly inconsistent with his recognition
of the distinction between a conspiracy to engage in present advocacy
and one to engage in such speech only in the future. Following a re-
view of the evidence, he reiterated the traditional common law rule that
the overt act, required under the statute, 60 need not "be the substan-
tive crime charged in the indictment as the object of the conspiracy"--
here, advocacy-nor need it "taken by itself, even be criminal in char-
acter."' 61 The analysis harks back to the idea of conspiracy as an
inchoate offense. Yates alone is confusing enough; when coupled with
the retraction in Noto, the matter is left quite unclear.
The language and rationale of Spock, like Dennis and the earlier
decisions, also seem to support prosecution without any illegal speech
having occurred. The thrust of the Spock court, so self-consciously
diligent in its attempt to restrict the scope of conspiracy in the first
amendment area, pushes inevitably to criminality of the still silent
combination. Though the First Circuit emphasized that illegal counsel-
ling and aiding and abetting had in fact taken place, it explicitly relied
on the commission of these other offenses only as fitting within one of
its three possible rubrics for proving specific intent. There were two
other permissible avenues outlined in the opinion: proving the defen-
dant's "prior or subsequent unambiguous statements" or his having
engaged in some other "legal act" undertaken to implement the con-
spiracy's illegal purpose. Neither would have required proof of illegal
160 During part of the period covered by the indictment in Yates, the recodified
Smith Act did not contain a conspiracy provision and thus the conspiracy allegation was
laid under the generally applicable federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970),
which, unlike the original Smith Act, required proof of an overt act. See 354 U.S. at
301-02 n.1.
161 354 U.S. at 334.
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speech by any of the defendants. This, of course, fits the underlying
conception of conspiracy; the illegality lies in the agreement itself
without regard to its implementation.
The unmistakable logic of Spock makes prosecution of a wholly
executory speech conspiracy a real possibility; it also makes clear that
the elements which need to be proven to support conviction even in the
case of a partially executed conspiracy are precisely the same. There
is no need-whatever the psychological benefit accruing to the prose-
cution in doing so where it can-to prove that the defendants have en-
gaged in any illegal speech. The case is complete, and conviction
proper, when it is shown merely that the defendants have agreed to
engage in illegal speech, that they have agreed to incite.
So conceived, speech-conspiracy raises serious problems. Of
course, it is possible to read the cases as confined to their facts and
imply a requirement that the occurrence of illegal speech is a prerequi-
site to conviction for conspiracy to commit a speech crime. To do so
would be salutary. But it would work a dramatic change in the per-
ceived nature of the offense, barring use of conspiracy to prosecute
inchoate crime in the speech area. Moreover, reading any such limi-
tation into the decisions would run directly contrary to their words
and logic. It is appropriate and necessary, therefore, to consider fur-
ther the difficulties presented when conspiracy to advocate is treated
as a punishable inchoate offense.
A. The Double-Layered Risk
Notwithstanding the common rhetorical flourishes concerning the
criminality of the agreement itself, punishment of conspiracy as a sep-
arate crime is justified, if at all, not because of any actual harm the
conspiracy has caused society, but because of the harm it threatens-
the danger it creates of collective or individual injury in the future if
and when active measures are taken to carry it out. Once the agree-
ment and requisite intent are shown, the risk of such injury and the
chance that harm will actually ensue are thought-rightly or wrongly
-to be sufficiently great, because of the combination, to warrant im-
position of the criminal sanction. The difficulty is that the conclusion
which may be warranted in other contexts, involving other kinds of
conspiracies, has been too readily applied in the speech context.
The justification for intervening through the criminal process in
the case of unexecuted conspiracy to murder, for example, is that
should the conspirators carry out their plans immediate and irrepara-
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ble harm is likely to result to the victim. 162 The case of conspiracy
to commit a speech crime is hardly comparable. Prosecution for con-
spiracy to incite to violence must be justified on remoter grounds. Just
as conspiracy itself is an inchoate crime, so too is incitement, like most
other speech crimes."6 Thus, to charge a speech conspiracy is to load
one inchoate offense upon another. Even if the conspirators act, the
immediate result is not violence but the impact on others of the as-
sertedly inciting words. These may or may not prove effective in achiev-
ing the conspirators' ends. Another stage must be reached before the
harm-here violence-befalls; the listeners must themselves move to
do that which the conspirators seek to induce.
A conspiracy to incite is thus an offense twice removed from the
substantive crime, an offense doubly distant from the evil sought to
be avoided. Even if the inciter is thought to be no less culpable than
the immediate perpetrator of the ultimate crime, he is at least one step
further removed from its commission. And the one who conspires to
incite is still another move distant from the overt commission, for
he is only planning to induce another to do the prohibited act. The
conspiracy originates the risk that the conspirators will actually carry
out their plan to incite, i.e., that they will in fact create a second risk,
the risk that others will be moved to commit the substantive offense.
The same is obviously true with respect to the crime of conspiring to
counsel commission of a crime, one of the charges brought against
Dr. Spock and his co-defendants. Conspiring to aid and abet may be
slightly different; to the extent, however, that it contemplates no ac-
tive assistance or initiative beyond speech, it does not go beyond the
conspiracy to incite.6 In any event, a conspiracy to aid and abet still
requires the intervention of another will, the need for another to act
and to perpetrate the ultimate crime. So here too, there remain two
steps prior to maturation of the actual harm; again, there are two cal-
culations of probability.
3.'
6 2 See text accompanying notes 2 1-29 supra.
163 Obscenity and libel/slander-both speech crimes-may be different. In the latter
case, the injury to reputation may be viewed as flowing directly from the utterance and
in that sense is immediate. If the ultimate evil of obscenity is its asserted propensity to
move others to commit sex crimes, for example, then it is like incitement; on the other
hand, if the harm is thought to be an offense to the sensibilities of others, it is direct and
is complete with the hearing.
164The federal "aiding and abetting" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), is broad enough
to encompass both speech and other affirmative assistance:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
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It is significant on several counts that the risk to which the prose-
cution responds is double-layered when the object of the conspiracy is
a speech crime. First, whatever justification the government seeks to
put forth as warranting the intrusion into the first amendment area is
necessarily diminished. Whether under the ad hoc balancing test, the
clear and present danger test, the modified Dennis test, or the proba-
bility-imminency standard of Brandenburg, the threat to the govern-
ment interest must be reduced, if only because one additional step
removed from actual maturation into realized harm.
Second, the increased remoteness of the crime of conspiracy to
incite from the ultimate evil not only points to a probable reduction
of the real danger to which the government is seeking to respond and
therefore to a lessening of the justification for the suppression of
speech, but also suggests the increased propriety of weighing alterna-
tive-and less oppressive-means of protecting legitimate govern-
mental interests, a consideration of constitutional magnitude. 165 The
double-layered nature of a conspiracy-speech crime immediately points
up the possibility of deferring a charge or finding of criminality until
the incitement stage is actually reached. In evaluating the propriety
of deferral, however, one must take account of two factors-the extent
to which the proferred alternative represents a loss of effectiveness in
protecting a legitimate governmental interest and the extent to which
it furthers first amendment or other constitutional interests. To the
extent the loss to the government is great or the gain to basic rights
small, there is little justification for urging the alternative.
B. Predictive Illegality
The very possibility of convicting someone for having participated
in a still unexecuted conspiracy to incite (or one in which there is no
proof that illegal incitement has occurred) raises practical and legal
problems that come close to placing the defined crime beyond legiti-
mate comprehension. 66 One way to describe the issue, albeit inade-
165 See note 150 supra.
166 It should normally make no difference for constitutional purposes whether the
conspiracy provision under which a specific speech-conspiracy charge is laid appears in
the same statute which proscribes the substantive offense, as in the original Smith Act,
or whether it is a general section, such as 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), applicable to
conspiracies to commit any substantive offense. Even where the legislative decision to
include conspiracy within the substantive statute took account of its application to speech
crimes and represents a conscious election, it should not foreclose questions as to the
validity of the provision either on its face or as applied. Certainly, the legislative
determination should not be treated as resolving either facial problems of vagueness
(overbreadth or uncertainty of definition) or the propriety of application in any par-
ticular case. Even in Dennis, in applying the original Smith Act (for which the Congress
quite clearly had a specific, extant "conspiracy" in mind), the Supreme Court thought it
necessary to find the existence of a "clear and present danger." At most, the legislative
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quately, is to label the problem as one of vagueness.16
The attempt to define the limits of speech, to specify the nature
and type of words or related conduct which lie beyond the bounds of
first amendment protection, has been one of the vexing challenges of
constitutional adjudication. While Yates, reinforced by Brandenburg,
drew the line between illegal incitement and permissible speech so as
to condemn only "advocacy of action," the opinion of the Court at
the same time conceded that the distinction was at best "subtle and
difficult to grasp."' 68 The conceptual differences, if not the practical
ones, between mere advocacy of ideas and incitement are shaded and
in any given case it may be extremely difficult to decide on which side
of the line the challenged expression may fall. The determination will
often require the most precise examination of the exact words of the
defendant and the setting in which they were spoken; even then there
may still be substantial ambiguity.
When the charge is conspiracy to incite, there is no longer any
need to prove that words of incitement or advocacy have actually been
used. Instead, the test is whether the defendants intended or agreed to
use such words. If there is often a serious problem in determining
whether specifically given speech constitutes incitement, the difficulties
choice should be read to speak to the special danger of group action of a particular
nature. But even so limited, there are still substantial questions, as for example, for how
long into the future should the determination be viewed as valid? See generally Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22
STAir. L. REv. 1163 (1970).
167 The term "vagueness" incorporates concepts of first amendment "overbreadth"
and due process lack of certain definition sufficient to guide prospective offenders, courts,
and juries; it is used here to refer to both. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960); Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAav. L. Ray. 844 (1970). It is well settled that "[tjhe
constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden . . ." United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Due process is
violated if the law "leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited
and what is not in each particular case.' Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03
(1966). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261-64 (1937). The evil, in first
amendment terms, of a vague statute is not only that it "lends itself to selective en-
forcement against unpopular causes," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963), but
that it reaches both protected and unprotected conduct--speech "which legitimately may
be proscribed" as well as speech "which may not be proscribed," Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967). And the very uncertainty inhibits exercise of rights of
speech and association. As Justice Frankfurter has written:
Prohibiting, indiscriminately, activity within and without the sphere of the
Fourteenth Amendments protection of free expression, those statutes had the
double vice of deterring the exercise of constitutional freedoms by making
the uncertain line of the Amendment's application determinative of criminality
and of prescribing indefinite standards of guilt, thereby allowing the potential
vagaries and prejudices of juries, effectively insulated against control by re-
viewing courts, the power to intrude upon the protected sphere.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 492 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
188 354 U.S. at 326. Justice Clark confessed that the "artillery of words" in Yates left
him "confused" and that "the distinctions are too 'subtle and difficult to grasp.'" Id. at
349-50.
1972]
238 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:189
of making such a judgment become nearly insurmountable when the
exact words are not even before the court. The judge and jury are left
to infer the content of the undisclosed speech from the defendant's
declared intent, or, as may be more likely, from his intent as itself
inferred from other evidence. When the speech being tested is merely
a projection from such questionable bases, there is an almost uncon-
trollable freedom to wander at large into impermissible areas. 69 And,
of course, it is highly questionable whether any effective review can be
exercised in the face of such a process 170
Moreover, in order to conclude that any given set of words is in-
citing, it is necessary not only to know what those words are, but to
have some basis for making a judgment about their effect. The speech
of the defendant must be placed in context both to understand its
meaning and to judge its probable impact. While the status of the
"clear and present danger" formulation is uncertain, present first
amendment standards surely seem to require some measurement of the
probable reaction of probable listeners to any given set of allegedly in-
citing words.' But absent a setting, an audience, and the speech itself,
the judgment becomes even more than prophetic; it is fantasy.'2 One
169 The words of the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958),
are apposite:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close
to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken
fact-finding-inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate
utterance will be penalized.
See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
170 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's use of the "void for vagueness" doctrine
as a device to control unreviewable decisionmaking, particularly by state courts (also a
potential source of speech-conspiracy cases), see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 67, 104-15 (1960).
171 The Supreme Court's ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969),
that the Constitution allowed proscription only of advocacy which "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action" certainly indicates that an evaluation must be made of the probable effect of the
challenged speech. Whether or not Brandenburg should be read as revitalizing the "clear
and present danger" test is another question. The concurring opinions of Justices Black
and Douglas in Brandenburg are based on their assumption that the case does not have
that consequence.
172 Cf. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), reviewing a conviction under a
Georgia statute proscribing "Ealny attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others
to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the state," id. at 246 n.2.
Though the state court read the statute to cover only violent resistance, it also ruled that
it was enough if the violence might be expected to occur at any reasonable time in the
future. Herndon v. State, 179 Ga. 597, 600, 176 S.E. 620, 622 (1934). In overturning
the conviction on "vagueness" grounds, the Supreme Court declared:
The statute, as construed and applied in the appellant's trial, does not
furnish a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt. The Act does not prohibit
incitement to violent interference with any given activity or operation of the
state. By force of it, as construed, the judge and jury trying an alleged offender
cannot appraise the circumstances and character of the defendant's utterances or
activities as begetting a clear and present danger of forcible obstruction of a
particular state function. Nor is any specified conduct or utterance of the
accused made an offense.
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is forced back even beyond what was done in the World War I Espio-
nage Act cases; there at least the Court read intent and effect from the
defendants' actual words; here, the words themselves are inferred from
the intent, often itself an inference, and then effect is inferred from the
assumed speech.
Even when intent appears clear, the attempt to measure the char-
acter and consequences of future advocacy is a hazardous business.
The distance between intent and realization can widen to a chasm and
the conspirator may either change his text (assuming he has even pre-
pared one in advance) or lose his courage. Moreover, his preparatory
rhetoric-possibly the very basis of the conspiracy charge-may over-
run his actual intent, as well as his actual performance, should it ever,
in fact, occur. The problem is unusually keen in this day of escalated
rhetoric and devalued epithet, when overstatement comes close to being
the rule, rather than the exception, among those most likely to be the
targets of efforts at suppression. 7 3
It is possible of course to say that since it is the agreement which
is being punished in the conspiracy case, the fact that no incitement
has actually occurred is of no moment and should give no reason for
pause. But this merely begs the question, since the punishment is based
upon an assumption that the parties have agreed to do something i-
legal, a determination which, as has been pointed out, can not be readily
made in advance in the speech context.
The risk is apparent. The defendant can be found guilty of con-
spiracy to incite even though the words he intended to utter might not
have been criminal if actually spoken and judged in actual context.
* . . If, by the exercise of prophesy, he can forecast that, as a result of a
chain of causation, following his proposed action a group may arise at some
future date which will resort to force, he is bound to make the prophesy and
abstain under pain of punishment, possibly of execution.... The question thus
proposed to a jury involves pure speculation as to future trends of thought and
action. ... The law, as thus construed, licenses the jury to create its own
standard in each case.
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet which
may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of government if a jury can be
persuaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in
the future conduct of others.
301 U.S. at 261-64.
173 The drafters of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code have noted:
The problem is in preventing legitimate agitation of an extreme or inflammatory
nature from being misinterpreted as solicitation to crime. It would not be
difficult to convince a jury that inflammatory rhetoric in behalf of an un-
popular cause is in reality an invitation to violate the law rather than an effort
to seek its change through legitimate criticism. Minority criticism has to be
extreme in order to be politically audible and if it employs the typical device
of lauding a martyr, who is likely to be a lawbreaker, the eulogy runs the risk
of being characterized as a request for emulation.
No solution to this problem has been found which is entirely satisfactory.
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.02, Comment at 88 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) (footnote omitted).
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Thus, unspoken words may be afforded less protection than actual
speech itself.
In the absence of a demonstration that prohibited advocacy has
taken place, it becomes clear that the punishment in a speech con-
spiracy case is for shared intent. But this is simply another way of
stating the underlying theory of all conspiracy prosecutions. The dif-
ference here, of course, is that what is being suppressed is speech,
not for example, an agreement to commit murder. The consequences
are substantial. With a conspiracy to murder one faces a potential
crime of finite proportion and of near unmistakable content. There is
little, if any, risk that either the defendants themselves, or the court
or jury, will mistake the criminality of what the defendants propose
to do. The probability of such a mistake both by the alleged conspira-
tors and by the trier of fact is very high, however, in the case of a
conspiracy to incite.
Of course, in both instances, there may be doubt about whether
the defendants have really agreed and, if so, about the firmness of their
intent.174 Certainly, the margin for tolerance of error favoring the de-
fendant is much greater in the incitement case than in the murder (or
robbery or embezzlement) case, for the risk in the former is doubly
inchoate and presumably there will almost always be another chance
for official intervention. Once the conspirators act to effect a murder,
however, the harm is likely to be irreparable.
Finally, and not least of all, the preferred position of first amend-
ment rights should lead to casting the balance in favor of protection
of speech rather than suppression. This is not to say that incitement
itself is protected, but that the utilization of the conspiracy device to
suppress it is improper.'75
174The imprecision inhering in the concepts of "agreement ' and "intent" in
conspiracy only add to the vague uncertainty. As one commentator has written:
If the prohibited purpose is clearly set forth in the conspiracy statute, the
difficulties are solely those involved in applying the concept of an agreement.
When, however, unlawful purpose is vaguely stated, the contours of "conspiracy"
become ever more vague, and the dividing line between intent, now designated
'purpose," and act, now termed "agreement," tends to disappear. Added to the
problems inherent in a concept created to deal with potential antisocial action
are new ones which arise when it is not at all clear what kind of antisocial
action is threatened.
Goldstein, supra note 13, at 407. And again:
Yet "agreement" is almost as much a theoretical construct as the "intent" it
is supposed to carry over the threshhold from fancy to fact. Indeed, in most cases,
it is proved by the very same evidence from which intent will be inferred. Thus,
instead of anchoring intangible intent to a tangible act, the law of conspiracy
makes intent an appendage of the equally intangible agreement. By pouring the
same proof into the mold of "agreement" and by calling that "agreement" an
"act"--passive though it may be--courts foster the already elaborate illusion
that conspiracy reaches actual, not potential, harm.
Id. 410.
175 The Scales-Noto-SPock requirement of strict proof of specific intent may
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C. "Prior Restraint"
The importation of conspiracy into the speech area has been con-
demned as an unconstitutional "prior restraint."'7 6 And, in the sense
that it can apply and work punishment for intent and agreement alone,
before any illegal speech occurs (or without proof that it has), it is
clearly a before-the-fact sanction. In such a situation, there can be no
pretense that the defendants are being tried for what they have already
said. But, as has been noted, the label "prior restraint" is not a "self-
wielding sword" or a "talismanic test," 177 automatically requiring a
judgment of impropriety. There remains the "duty of closer analysis
and critical judgment in applying the thought behind the phrase.'
78
In fact, criminal conspiracy seems at first to be quite different
from the usual prior restraint case which typically involves some
before-the-fact civil injunctive prohibition on speech. The conspiracy
case is criminal and, while one purpose may be to deter speech as with
an injunction, another is to punish for the ostensibly complete criminal
conduct involved in having combined for an illegal purpose. The con-
stitutional concept of prior restraint has normally been thought to ap-
arguably compensate, in part, for the generic imprecision of speech-conspiracy and the
almost inevitable uncertainty as to the nature of unproven speech and the reality of
the prophesized danger. By no means, however, does it solve the problem, especially
given the inferential subjectivity of the intent determination itself. The general tendency
to incorporation of a requirement of intent, mens rea, or "scienter," into statutes
challenged as "vague" has been noted elsewhere. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 87 n.98 (1960). The author
suggests that this attempted solution is less than satisfactory and comments:
In any event, "scienter" has become a recognized element of the lore of
vagueness, and represents at its best, a tool to be designedly used in the service of
other ends; at its worst, a port of entry for the ethical predilections of the
then sitting Court.
The suggestion is not unwarranted. The element of intent-though in certain instances
it may function as an exonerating factor-can also serve to shift the focus of inquiry
and function as a subjective justification for invocation of legal proscriptions where the
substantive threat of harm is realistically lacking. The World War I cases, with their
emphasis on state of mind and their minimization of any real requirement of danger,
are an example. Spock itself may be another. It is simply too easy to assume that proof
of specific intent eliminates other difficulties. Doubt as to the reality of the danger,
concern over inhibiting the innocent, and worry that conviction may be based on par-
ticipation in protected activity can be all salved by compelling a finding of specific intent
so that at very least, we can say that we are punishing only those whose motives are
faulty. The result may be conscience-easing, but it hardly substitutes for facing the
difficult constitutional and practical problems presented by the very nature of the crime.
In sum, undue reliance on proof of intent may operate to allow convictions not otherwise
supportable, or, as in Scales, Spock, and Noto, to allow adoption of constitutional rules
of a doubtful nature.
176Justice Black applied the label in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579. See also Note,
Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YArE LJ. 872, 881 (1970).
177 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
178 Id. at 441. The Court also quoted with approval, id. at 442, Professor Freund's
observation that: "What is needed is a pragmatic assessment of its operation in the
particular circumstances. The generalization that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious
in civil liberties cases must yield to more particularistic analysis . . . 2' Freund, The
Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAl, . L. Rav. 533, 539 (1951).
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ply mainly in the case of administrative censorship 79 (though the
generating Supreme Court case, Near v. Minnesota,'80 involved a ju-
dicial injunction), and to have no application to criminal sanctions.
Indeed, the criminal case brought subsequent to publication is usually
posed as the proper alternative to prior civil or administrative inhibi-
tion.
Where licensing schemes or systems calling for prior administra-
tive approval of speech have been struck down, it has often been be-
cause of defects of design rather than the inherent unconstitutionality
of the concept underlying the restriction. Thus, findings of impropriety
have been based on the absence of an adequate standard to control the
exercise of administrative discretion,' 8 ' the lack of precision with which
the proscribed speech is described,' or the absence of effective or
sufficiently prompt judicial review. 3 Significantly, not all prior re-
straints are unconstitutional; the Court has indicated that a scheme
of prior control, with affirmative prohibition in advance of publication
or public showing, would be permitted so long as strict procedural,
burden of proof, and timing requirements were met.8
It would seem that the typical criminal conspiracy case would
meet the necessary procedural requirements: the trial is judicial and
prompt review is normally accorded. Moreover, the burden is on the
government to submit proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and jury trial
is available-two factors which, given the traditional reasoning about
prior restraints, would seem to favor constitutionality as against the
179 See, e.g., Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTET'. PROB.
648, 655 (1955):
The clearest form of prior restraint arises in those situations where the govern-
ment limitation, expressed in statute, regulation, or otherwise, undertakes to
prevent future publication or other communication without advance approval
of an executive official.
The doctrines barring prior restraint, of course, do not establish that the state cannot
regulate, prohibit, or punish speech; rather they deal with the questions of when and
how it may be done. The issues raised in the prior restraint cases go to the method,
timing, and procedure of the restraint, not to the kinds of speech which are suppressible.
But cf. note 185 infra.
180 283 U.S. 697 (1931). It should be noted that criminal conspiracy goes even
beyond the restriction held unconstitutional in the landmark Near case. There the Court
struck down as an improper "prior restraint" a Minnesota statute declaring regular
publication of certain kinds of material ("obscene, lewd and lascivious" or "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory") to be an enjoinable nuisance. It appeared, under the
statute, that prior publication of the prohibited type was a prerequisite to the action; a
mere showing that the defendant intended to publish such material was apparently not
enough, as it would be in a speech-conspiracy action.
181 See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951).
18 2 See Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
183 See Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
184 See cases cited note 183 supra.
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administrative or civil proceeding tried to an agency or judge under a
less restrictive burden of proof standard.
In addition, the primary concern of the prior restraint cases seems
to be the fear of largely unrestricted censorship, of the need to submit
proposed publications for approval (especially administrative) before
dissemination, a problem not really present in the typical conspiracy
case. This is not to say, however, that the learning surrounding prior
restraint is inapplicable to the speech-conspiracy case.
The arguments that can be made in favor of a prior civil deter-
mination of suppressibility are precisely the ones which point to the
impropriety of the conspiracy sanction. Prior civil restraints, if prop-
erly surrounded with procedural protections, have the advantage of
providing a judicial resolution in advance of publication, expression,
or showing, without the publisher, seller, speaker, distributor, or movie
theater operator having to undergo the risk of criminal prosecution;
punishment results only if the scheme is ignored altogether or if a
specific restrictive order is violated. Such assertedly compensating ad-
vantages do not exist with criminal conspiracy which presents the
unique combination of a criminal sanction being applied before the
fact of actual speech; the defendant is punished for speech he has not
yet uttered. Unlike the approved schemes of prior restraint, the remedy
is not a civil order barring future expression, but a criminal sanction
imposed for intended future expression.
There is a further distinguishing factor between advance civil re-
straints and criminal conspiracy. The cases dealing with prior restraints
have largely involved books or films. In such instances the proposed
expression is in existence in a final form and can be carefully examined
to see if its distribution or showing would in fact violate constitutional
obscenity standards. Often, of course, this will not be true of the
speech-conspiracy case; where the proposed communication is oral,
there is nothing in existence by which to judge the illegality of the
future expression except an inference based upon whatever evidence
may be available concerning the defendant's expressed or unexpressed
subjective intent. Even, for example, where there is a text of a proposed
speech available, there is no certainty that it will be delivered as writ-
ten. The judgment thus becomes wholly predictive, with the conse-
quences not merely suppression of the speech, as would be true in the
case of the usual prior restraint, but punishment for its mere intended
delivery?8 5 It is the most "prior" of prior restraints.
185 One factor the Court has emphasized in the prior restraint cases is the great
need for prompt resolution of the issue of legality of the challenged speech; the absence
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It is possible to transform Spock, for example, into the classic
prior restraint case. One wonders what the First Circuit would have
done, or what the Supreme Court might have done, particularly
after the Pentagon Papers Case,""0 had Spock arisen as an injunctive
action brought while the "conspiracy" remained wholly executory, that
is, before any of the defendants had engaged in any actual counselling
or aiding or abetting-if for example, the government had sought to
enjoin issuance of the Call, or the holding of (or defendants' partici-
pation in) either the Boston or Washington rallies.' 87 It seems likely
that the attempted suppression would have been labelled prior restraint
and the requested relief denied, even if all the other facts-defendants'
combination in the proposed action, etc.--had remained the same. At
the very least, the government would have had to overcome the "heavy
presumption against ... constitutional validity" which the Court has
recently re-emphasized every "system of prior restraints of-expression"
must bear. 88 The use of such language is totally foreign to the criminal
conspiracy cases, though one wonders why. It is extremely difficult to
understand why the same constitutional doubts that would apply in the
case of a civil injunction should bear any less heavily in the criminal
conspiracy case where the sanction is not merely prohibitive, but puni-
tive. Nonetheless, the courts talk in terms of adequacy of governmental
interest in the conspiracy context and fail to invoke the more stringent
standard applicable in the less onerous civil context.
As noted, the civil injunction imposes no penalty, beyond the
suppression itself, except if the court order is subsequently violated,
and presumably any such order would, or should, be closely and care-
fully drawn with a specificity that minimized potential vagueness of
application and gave clear warning of the limits beyond which the
defendants could not go. Moreover, the order would presumably be
directed to specific individuals for whom actual notice of it would be
of any fixed short period of time between initiation of the proceeding and final judgment
threatens to moot the need or propitiousness of the expression itself. See cases cited note
183 supra. A similar danger obviously exists with respect to the criminal conspiracy case,
with its usual delay between initiation of the proceedings (by information or before a
grand jury) and the conclusion of trial and verdict. It would be difficult to abbreviate
the required period within the kinds of limits the Court seems to consider necessary in
prior restraint cases without potentially jeopardizing other constitutional rights of the
accused.
186 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
187 A similarly close parallel-running the other way-would have been presented
if the government, in the Pentagon Papers Case, note 186 supra, instead of seeking
injunctive relief against the Times and Post, had brought a criminal conspiracy indict-
ment against one of the papers and its employees charging them, prior to actual
publication, with an illegal conspiracy to publish. One wonders whether the Court,
though unwilling to allow an injunction at that stage, would nonetheless have condoned
the criminal action.
1 88 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), quoting
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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a due process prerequisite to subsequent punishment. None of these
protections is available in the conspiracy context, where vagueness
is one of the major difficulties.
On a number of grounds then, criminal conspiracy-at least as
used as a before-the-fact sanction on inchoate speech-presents an
even stronger case for unconstitutionality than the usually invalid typ-
ical prior restraint. If real need there be, the injunctive prohibition,
with proper procedural requirements met, would appear in many ways
a preferable and less oppressive method of dealing with the unwanted
and truly threatening speech than the prior criminal restraint.
D. The "Hard" Case
The preceding analysis has stressed the difficulty, in a speech-
conspiracy case, of judging the legality of what the defendant intends
but has not yet done. Yet, one can at least hypothesize cases in which
the difficulty is minimized-cases in which there is some apparently
solid basis for determining the character of the defendant's proposed
speech and appraising its probable effect on a specific audience for
which it was designed. For example, one can suppose a situation in
which the proposed advocacy was in the form of an already printed
pamphlet or handbill admittedly prepared for use at a specific, already
scheduled rally. One might additionally assume that there was inde-
pendent evidence that the defendants intended that the distribution of
the written message would help set off a riot, and that the actual text
contained language which had a high probability of doing exactly that.
Conjecture about the nature of the speech, the circumstances and
manner of its delivery, and its possible or probable effect on a particu-
lar audience is either eliminated or considerably narrowed.8 9 Why, in
such an instance, is not a prosecution for conspiracy to incite to riot
an appropriate tool of effective law enforcement?
There are several possible answers. The first is that it might be
reasonable to allow prosecution under the conspiracy rubric in that
precise case. The facts are designed to state the strongest situation;
they eliminate many of the objections to the use of conspiracy and do
so in a context in which prosecution for a more substantive offense-
actual incitement-is not available as an alternative. Yet there are
strong countervailing reasons which militate against allowing the prose-
cution.
189 The hypothetical might be considered a variant of People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d
496, 227 NE.2d 829, 281 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1967), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 390
U.S. 29 (1968). Cf. Rockwell v. Morris, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 NXE.2d 162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1961). See also Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957); Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
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First, primary justification for official intervention prior to actual
dissemination of the defendants' message in this case is not punish-
ment, but suppression of the speech and prevention of the probable
riot. The legal weapon best designed to achieve this objective is not
the criminal sanction, but a civil one, the injunction. This is the tradi-
tional prior restraint and carries with it a range of traditional objec-
tions; 9 but the criminal charge is, in this instance, no less prior,
brings objections of its own, and is ill-fitted to the particular need.
While the defendants will lose the advantage of jury trial in an injunc-
tive action, the overall result is likely to be less inhibiting, at least as
to third parties whose situation is truly ambiguous, and the sanction
will be more carefully tailored to the desired result. 91 Once again, the
rifle seems preferable to the shotgun, if those are the only choices and
one or the other must be used. Moreover, compelling recourse to the
civil sanction is more likely to result in a closer scrutiny of the real
need to suppress the proposed speech at all. Tradition once again seems
to play a significant role, but here a happy one, in that the injunctive
prior restraint is viewed with a highly jaundiced constitutional eye;
the presumption is at least said to be against constitutionality, rather
than in favor of it, as appears to be true in the criminal case?92 A rea-
sonable expectation is that the restraint would less often be imposed
where unwarranted.
The second objection goes to the need for any sanction, criminal
or civil. There would be no criminal option available at all if the pam-
phlet and its expected distribution represented the work of a single
individual. With one person acting alone, there would be no basis for
a conspiracy prosecution, and the authorities would have to await
actual incitment. If society can take that risk in the case of one person,
19 0 See text accompanying notes 179-88 supra.
191The "inhibition" here should be distinguished from that usually involved in
comparing prior civil restraints with subsequent criminal punishment. It is usually
assumed that subsequent punishment is less a deterrent than a prior injunctive restriction;
whether this premise is right or wrong may be disputable, but the presumed value of
relying on post hoc punishment is that it occurs after the speech has been uttered. See,
e.g., Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, Forward: Even When a Nation Is at War,
85 HARV. L. RaV. 3, 34 (1971); Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold:
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. RIv. 271, 278 (1971). When both the
civil injunction and the criminal sanction are applied before the fact, it may be more
likely that the former will lessen the chance of the speech occurring. To the extent that
the criminal charge carries with it the certainty of punishment in the event of conviction,
whether the speaker goes ahead or not, it arguably is no independent deterrent at all once
there has been an indictment. Of course, if his words, when spoken, actually constitute
incitement, he may later be prosecuted for that crime as well, i.e.x, the threat of
subsequent punishment remains. It does seem clear though, that the threat of a before-
the-fact conspiracy prosecution would be more effectively and-more broadly chilling of
speech ights--both as to those who would speak and as to those who might be
indicted as co-conspirators--than any threatened injunction.
1 92 See text accompanying note 188 supra.
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how does the situation change so dramatically by simple addition of
another, whose participation, for example, might have been limited
solely to writing the inflammatory tract? It is possible to assume a
group of fifty, of course, whose ability to achieve greater distribution
of the tract might increase the risk, but it is also possible to assume,
even given a "conspiracy," that the distribution wil still be by one
alone. The variant assumptions are really not very helpful. One sus-
pects that responsible authorities, if moved by genuine fear of riot and
minded to intervene at all, would resort to an injunction in any of these
cases, be it one or more persons involved. 93
Third, it is essential to remember that the case is a hypothetical one,
constructed to raise the issues most sharply; it has not been found in
the reported decisions. 94 Significantly, the leading speech-conspiracy
cases all involve situations in which allegedly illegal incitement or ad-
vocacy has already taken place. While less than conclusive, this raises
doubt whether the case has arisen, or will ever arise, in the form sug-
gested; more importantly, it suggests that if it has, other means (proper
or improper) were found to deal with it and that the case to be made
for the necessity of the conspiracy sanction in such an instance is
highly suspect. At best, the situation appears extremely rare and its
incidence hardly supports the need to preserve the highly questionable
and dangerous "conspiracy to incite" for general use against the un-
executed agreement. 95
Finally, the courts have made no attempt to limit the scope of
speech-conspiracy to the facts of the hypothetical case; if they had, the
entire matter would be far less troublesome. The rationale of the
crime allows its broad-gauged use (and misuse) in situations where
there is no real threat; experience with the "clear and present danger"
standard in the World War I Espionage Act cases, and its variant in the
Communist Party cases, gives faint hope of effective limitation. Were
193 Indeed, in analogous situations, this seems to be what was done. See cases cited
note 189 supra.
194 The closest cases are similar to those cited in note 189 suPra, and are distinguish-
able. Thus, in Epton, "inciting" and other preparatory conduct had already been engaged
in and could have been used as the basis of the indictment. While Rockwell, Kasper,
and Brewer involved an asserted need to stifle speech before utterance, none arose as a
criminal charge of conspiracy. Rockwell involved issuance of a permit and the rest a
judicial injunction, which, though speaking to the future, was based upon past words
or conduct. In some of the cases, at least, the defendants' prior words or actions could
presumably have been the foundation of a criminal prosecution--charging either
conspiracy to incite or incitement-and the relevant authorities decided to so proceed.
195 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has proposed
the elimination of this kind of prosecution at least in a limited area. Their proposed code
would not allow prosecution for conspiracy to advocate insurrection "unless [the de-
fendant] engaged in conduct under circumstances in which there was a substantial likeli-
hood that it would imminently produce [armed insurrection]." NATIONAL COMMISSIOz
ON REFoaM 0s' FEDERAL CRmINeAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEw FEDERAL CRMrNAL CODE
§ 1103(4) (a) (Final Report 1971).
19721
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it otherwise-had the courts given promise of appropriate restriction
on the use of conspiracy doctrine-the implications of allowing prose-
cution of the hypothetical case would be less ominous.
E. The Remaining Justification
With remarkable consistency, the courts have adhered to the
doctrine that an agreement to engage in prohibited speech is itself
punishable as a crime. Yet one is struck by the apparent fact that
prosecution is invariably brought only after the allegedly illegal speech
or advocacy has taken place.
Of course, it is possible to say that the likelihood of actual prose-
cution of an executory speech conspiracy is no more than a straw man;
no such examples were discovered and, it might be suggested, the prob-
ability that any would arise is too self-evidently remote to be worthy of
comment. This proves too much, however, for any concession that none
have been or would be brought is also a concession either of impro-
priety or of the absence of any need to do so, or both. Whichever it may
be, the justification-practical or theoretical-for use of conspiracy
as a purely inchoate offense in the speech area is stripped of its founda-
tion. To say that a prosecutor could not or would not frame a speech-
conspiracy case in which the offending words have not yet been uttered
is a convincing declaration that to do so would be an abuse or that
recourse to such an action is simply not essential to protection of
society from incipient harm. The corollary of this conclusion is that
the speech-conspiracy charge would be (is) used only where the illegal
incitement or advocacy had already occurred and indictment for the
more substantive offense was possible. But if prior illegal speech is
viewed as either a practical or constitutional requirement of conviction,
then the gravest doubt is cast on the propriety of the speech-conspiracy
case altogether. The argument for use of conspiracy as a necessary
device to thwart inchoate crime-here incitement or advocacy-fails
because those offenses must have already occurred and prosecution for
them is possible. The reasoning which would sustain use of conspiracy
as an inchoate offense simply does not stand up when the charge is
relied upon as an alternative to, or additional ground of, prosecution
in the case of the executed conspiracy. When the illegal speech has
already occurred, some other footing must be found to support con-
tinued use of the conspiracy charge; it can no longer be defended as
necessary to prevent either realization of the offending speech or matu-
ration of the threatened harm. The burden would thus seem to shift to
those who would urge the necessity of conspiracy as an alternative or
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supplementary charge in the context of the completed substantive
speech offense. There are several possible justifications.
First, to the extent that the completed offense represents only
part of the conspiratorial design, it could be said that a charge of con-
spiracy was appropriate and necessary to thwart the still executory
portions of the group plan. Indeed, Spock is arguably that precise
situation-a case in which prosecution was brought not simply to
punish the defendants for what they had already done, but to prevent
continuation of their efforts to achieve as yet unrealized objectives of
the combination. Even with this conception, however, the argument
assumes the conclusion, since it fails to explain why prosecution for
the already extant substantive offenses is inadequate to the task. It is
difficult to understand why, since indictable substantive offenses had
already occurred, conviction for those crimes-counselling and aiding
and abetting-would not prove sufficient to forestall similar conduct
in the future; and if it would not, what basis is there to think that
putting a conspiracy label on the case would have any different effect?
In addition, another central difficulty remains, that of prosecuting the
defendants for the unexecuted portions of the agreement which must
be read in the light of speech still to occur.
Another reason which might be advanced to support application
of the conspiracy doctrine to speech is drawn from the general justi-
fication for its application in other contexts where the substantive
offense has already occurred. Analogizing to the organized crime case,
for example, it might be argued that the conspiracy net is essential to
catch those who because of their peripheral or less direct participation
in the completed speech crime would not otherwise be subject to con-
viction. The answer seems self-evident. Those who are neither direct
participants in speech crimes nor punishable under stricter standards as
accomplices or aiders and abettors probably should not be punished at
all.10 The potential gains-a highly doubtful increase in deterrence,
and punishment of a few additional peripheral figures for speech crimes
196 A prosecution for aiding and abetting, or being an accomplice to a speech crime,
while preferable to use of a conspiracy charge, is also not without problems. Indeed, some
of the same difficulties of conspiracy exist with regard to these other offenses, albeit to
a lesser degree. The aiding and abetting concept partakes of vagueness and has been
construed to allow relaxation of the hearsay rule to permit, on an "agency" rationale,
introduction of the admissions of one defendant against another. See, e.g., United States
v. Dowery, 334 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933. For reasons similar
to those advanced here with respect to conspiracy, it might be argued, and perhaps should
be, that no accomplicelike liability should be permitted at all in conjunction with speech
crimes. Whatever their problems, however, these crimes of direct complicity-aiding and
abetting and being an accomplice-are highly preferable to conspiracy. Commission of
the substantive offense is a prerequisite to their use and thus there is no element of
inchoacy. The underlying concepts, while not as specific as they might be, are, among
other things, considerably less elastic than conspiracy and the element of vicarious
liability is greatly diminished, as are the procedural advantages to the prosecution.
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-seem clearly outweighed by the costs-potential prosecutorial abuse,
chilling of speech and associational rights, and possible conviction of
innocent persons at the fringe of constitutional protection, the self-
same group for whom the courts express such concern. To suffer, for
such questionable advantage, the vagueness and flexibility of speech-
conspiracy, with its loose evidentiary and trial rules, seems inconsistent
with the demands of the first amendment; the speech area is the very
one in which we should least want to cast the broadest net of crimi-
nality and in which one would expect procedural requirements to be
among the strictest, not the most lenient. 9 7
In short, then, if actual illegal speech is not an essential element
of the speech-conspiracy, all such prosecutions partake of the vagaries
and vagueness of predictive criminality, the first amendment notwith-
standing; there is no distinction to be drawn between the executed and
the unexecuted speech-conspiracy and both are equally punishable.
Alternatively, if there must be some actual illegal speech activity
before prosecution will properly lie, then the stated rationale of the
crime must be found elsewhere than in the loose litany of the need for
intervention to prevent assertedly illegal speech, for it has already oc-
curred. Moreover, some explanation must be forthcoming as to why
prosecution for the direct speech offense is not sufficient to protect the
public interest. It is time the courts demonstrated candor in describing
the offense and declaring its requisite elements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Three important interests are involved in the appraisal of con-
spiracy doctrine as applied to speech. Each has a strong claim to
recognition. The first is society's interest in preventing or punishing
the occurrence of substantive evil-the threatened consequences of
advocacy which does in fact pose a real danger. Second is the need to
assure that individual defendants are adequately insulated from un-
warranted prosecution and conviction and that their individual rights
(procedural and substantive) are not denied or unduly threatened.
Finally, there is the broader first amendment interest, the need to
safeguard the constitutional rights of free speech and association, both
of the individual defendants and of others; the risk is the loss to
society-the body politic-flowing from inhibition of the very discourse
which the first amendment was intended to protect and foster.
197 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958), is again relevant:
[S]ince the validity of a restraint on speech in each case . . . depends on careful
analysis of the particular circumstances, the procedures by which the facts of
the case are adjudicated are of special importance and the validity of the
restraint may turn on the safeguards which they afford.
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It is because speech-conspiracy so obviously intertwines these
related, but conflicting, concerns that the problems inhering in its use
have sometimes seemed so intractable. Resolution of the conflict, how-
ever, has almost always been in favor of suppression of speech. That
resolution is unwarranted.
Use of conspiracy in the speech area does not appreciably foster
society's interest in law and order. It is rarely, if ever, applied to the
executory speech-conspiracy. Viewed as a device designed to forestall
incipient harm, it is of doubtful efficacy. Employed after commission
of a speech crime, it is unnecessary, though doubtless advantageous to
prosecutors.
However utilized, conspiracy doctrine imports pervasively vague
concepts into the speech area and needlessly inhibits the exercise of
constitutional rights. Its invocation carries with it concepts of vicarious
liability, leads to procedural laxities, and invites prosecutorial over-
reaching. Procedural protections devised to guard against such conse-
quences in the ordinary criminal conspiracy case are wholly inadequate
in the speech area where the possibility of bias is magnified by the
fact that the defendants are characteristically unpopular dissenters.
And the very vagueness of the speech-conspiracy offense drastically
limits the possibility of either meaningful control of juries or of effec-
tive appellate review.
The combination of conspiracy with speech crimes should be held
unconstitutional. Reliance on steps short of this seem inadequate to
meet the manifold problems engendered by the crime. Little more, if
anything, can be added to the intent element as elaborated in Scales,
Noto and Spock. Enlarging the substantive content and significance of
the overt act, even if made necessary in all cases, is futile. If the overt
act must be the illegal speech itself, then the crime has ceased to be
inchoate and prosecution for incitement is possible; if the overt act
must be something other than speech, but may still be innocent in itself
(like purchasing paper to print a leaflet), it adds little, if anything; 9 s
if it must be criminal, then prosecution may be brought to deal with
that conduct. judicially imposed restrictions on the applicability in
speech cases of the loose procedural and evidentiary rules usually avail-
able to the prosecution in a conspiracy case would go to but one aspect
of the dangers inhering in the charge.
Denying the government the use of the conspiracy charge in
198 In Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 30 (1968) (concurring and dissenting
opinions), justices Stewart and Douglas raised the question of whether it is ever proper
to rely on protected speech as an overt act in any conspiracy case. Even were the
answer negative, it would still not meet the underlying difficulties peculiar to conspiracy
to commit a speech crime.
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speech cases will have a number of beneficial effects.199 In Spock, for
example, the prosecution would have been obliged to charge "aiding
and abetting" or "counselling" or "inciting," i.e., the direct speech
crimes. Of course, Goodman and Coffin might still have been convicted
of those offenses. But elimination of the conspiracy element would have
reduced the asserted crime to something much more concrete in both
a legal and a lay sense; the vague, polymorphous aspect of conspiracy
would have given way to a more tangible and manageable indictment.
There would have been a single level of definitional uncertainty, that
flowing from the imprecision of the constitutional line between legal
and illegal speech. As difficult as that distinction may be, it is still a
more workable standard than that which results when it is overlaid with
the shaded contours of conspiracy. There would have been a clearer
focus on the existence, vel non, of a real danger as posed by the specific
speech of the specific defendants, rather than by the amorphous agree-
ment. The evidence would have been more narrowly constricted and
presented in a more orderly fashion. The jury would have been
presented with a clearer case under simpler instructions and there
would have been less chance of error (in procedure or verdicts) at
trial and a better opportunity for correction on appeal. There might
well have been fewer actual defendants and certainly fewer potential
defendants. Guilt would have been personal, not vicarious or associa-
tional, and each defendant would have been liable only for what he
said; there would have been little reason to fear liability for the words
or actions of others. There would have been no chance of conviction
for what the jury believed any of the defendants might have intended
199 One possible response to invalidation of the use of speech-conspiracy as a
criminal offense is that prosecutors--desirous of retaining untoward trial advantage-
would simply reframe indictments to charge a conspiracy to commit the ultimate
substantive offense which the defendants' allegedly inciting speech was designed to
produce. Thus, in lieu of an indictment for conspiracy to incite riot, the charge could
become conspiracy to riot. But, if words are to have meaning, the variation must have
substantive import and work a change in the nature of the proof required. It should not
be enough to demonstrate merely that the defendants intended to make a speech or dis-
tribute literature; it would have to be shown that they intended to do more-to make
or supply weapons, for example, or to participate in the riot themselves-and that these
were the objectives of their agreement.
It has been suggested that another way of dealing with this assumed prosecutorial
response would be for the courts to look through the face of indictments to determine
whether what is really being charged is a conspiracy to commit a speech crime. See
Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.. 872, 890-93 (1970). It is
possible that where overt acts are required and charged, this could be done, at least by
rejecting those indictments in which the only such acts alleged are speech. Beyond this,
however, the suggestion raises problems. In most cases, it will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to make the requisite judgment before the government has put on its case,
i.e., before trial. Once the proceeding has moved to that stage, the issue becomes one of
adequacy of proof, not adequacy of the pleading. The underlying need, then, is for
courts to insist that the government show that there was a conspiracy to commit the
substantive offense, not merely to incite its occurrence.
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to say in the future; punishment would clearly have been for words
already spoken.
The court in Spock could presumably have found a much more
satisfactory basis for distinguishing among the various defendants and
the permissibility of findings of guilt as to each (assuming that all
would have been indicted). The court would not have been constrained
to direct acquittal or allow retrial on such palpably subjective and
unsatisfactory grounds as it did.
In sum, the consequence would have been a fairer result and a
greater clarity in the law-a more assured basis for foreseeing the
potentiality of criminal conduct and a reduced danger of chilling the
rights of others who might see themselves as potential defendants in
a similar situation. The first amendment requires no less.
